1757-08-30 - Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf

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Hierarchical Path: Seven Years War (Main Page) >> Battles >> 1757-08-30 - Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf

Russian Victory


After capturing Memel (present-day Klaipeda/Lithuania) early in July 1757 and securing the town as a place of arms and magazine, the Russian army under Apraxin proceeded to the invasion of East Prussia. Field-Marshall Lehwaldt, commanding the Prussian army, was ordered to oppose this invasion and to march towards the Russian army.

On August 29, Lehwaldt left his camp at Wehlau (present-day Znamensk) and advanced to attack the Russians who had crossed the Pregel (present-day Pregolya River) and had encamped at Gross-Jägesdorf (present-day Motornoje). The Prussians too crossed the Pregel and Lehwaldt took up his camp behind a thick wood between Ranglack (unidentified location) and Pushsdorf (present-day Pushkarevo). At his camp, Lehwaldt had 22 bns and 50 sqns for a total of 16,500 foot and 8,200 horse; with 35 battalion guns and 20 heavy pieces.

Soon after his arrival, Field-Marshall Lehwaldt tried to reconnoitre the Russian positions with a small escort but could discover nothing of their large army and only perceived a few Cossacks encampments. He dispatched Lieutenant-General Schorlemmer, the Prince of Holstein, General Platen and General Ruesch with 2 hussar regiments, 15 dragoon squadrons and 2 grenadier battalions by the road to Almenhausen, to obtain more accurate intelligence. The grenadier battalions were posted in the wood and the cavalry advanced into the plain while the army remained under arms in camp, ready to move. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to reconnoitre the Russian positions with sufficient exactness and a mere camp of irregulars was mistakenly considered as the left flank of the Russian army. Therefore, Lehwaldt's plan of attack for the following day was based on the flawed hypothesis that the Russian left extended to Sitterfeldt.

During this reconnaissance, it was reported to Lehwaldt that a number of foragers appeared to the right. In consequence of which, Lehwaldt moved with some troops from the camp to drive them away and to reinforce General Schorlemmer. By some misunderstanding, the Prussian army, contrary to his orders, got under arms and followed him through the wood, in front of which they then formed. This was soon perceived by the Cossacks. The alarm was given in the Russian camp and their army got under arms, but as they did not move, Lehwaldt caused his troops to march back into their camp. General Schorlemmer, who still remained in front of the wood, was cannonaded for some time, but without suffering any loss.

Lehwaldt resolved to attack the Russian left flank which appeared to be the weakest. In fact, the ground upon the Russian right flank at Weynothen (present-day Schljusnoje) was very difficult, on account of several old ponds, between which there was no other passage than the narrow dykes by which they were divided.


Map of the Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf on August 30 1757 - Situation at 6:00 a.m.
Source: Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, volume III by the German Grosser Generalstab
Copyright Tony Flores
Map of the Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf on August 30 1757 - Situation at 9:30 a.m.
Source: Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, volume III by the German Grosser Generalstab
Copyright Tony Flores

The battlefield, an undulating plain, was delimited to the north by the Pregel; to the east, by one of its tributary, the Aurinne and the brook of Romehlis; to the south by swampy meadows, the Forest of Astrawischken and the Roser Wood; and to the west by the forests of Almenhausen and Puschdorf. The Pregel and the Aurinne presented a serious obstacle for all type of troops. Despite their small height, numerous, often barely visible, hillocks provided cover for troops.

In the middle of the battlefield, running from east to west, a small flattened ridge (approx. 30 m.) reached its highest elevation in the Norkitten Wood. To the north and south, there were hollows in the meadow criss-crossed by small brooks however they did not hamper troop movements. To the south, the banks of the Sittengraben were swampy and the meadow south-east of Uderballen (present-day Iswilino), quite soaky.

A road led to Allenburg ((present-day Druzhba) by Sittenfledt (unidentified location) and Muldszen (present-day Perevalovo). To the south-west, this road crossed the flattened hillock of Uszbundzen (present-day Voronovo) which offered a wide field of fire to any troop occupying it.

The Norkitten Woods, the focal point of the battle, extended some 2 km from south-east to north-west with a depth between 700 to 1,000 m. It was so thick and swampy that it was difficult to move across it. At the south-eastern corner of the wood a hillock of 30 m. offered a good field of fire to south and south-west. Similarly, at the north-western corner, another hillock, occupied by an outpost of Russian artillery, offered a good field of fire up to the small forest of Kuthkehmen (present-day Ushakovo).

The wood behind which Lehwaldt had taken his camp between Ranglack and Pushsdorf had three outlets which led to the Russian camp. The first was a road by the side of the river and was guarded by Malachowski Hussars. The two others had roads which were so broad that troops could move on them with a whole division in front. These avenues were guarded by piquets and the wood itself was dense and impassable.

Immediately after the Prussian troops had passed the Pregel, the Russian army encamped in a very irregular line to the east of Gross-Jägersdorf, north of the Norkitten Woods (present-day Mezdurechye) and south of the Pregel River. The cavalry of their right wing was posted in front of Weynothen and extended to Mischullen (unidentified location); the right wing of the infantry had their flanks at Weynothen and extended from there through the wood to the Schlossberg, with the left to the rivulet of Auxina where the banks were steep and difficult of access. The cavalry of the left wing and the swarm of their light horse were drawn up between Sitterfeldt and the Norkitten Woods.

The Russian army counted 89 bns, 40 grenadier coys, 41 sqns and 5 sotnias of regular troops; and 119 sotnias and 6 commands of irregulars for a total of some 36,000 foot, 200 dismounted dragoons, 7,500 regular horse and 11,500 irregular horse; with 154 3-pdr regimental guns, 30 secret howitzers, and 79 field pieces.

Description of Events


In the evening of August 29, thinking that the Russians would await his attack in the same positions which they previously occupied, Lehwaldt issued the following orders:

At 2:30 a.m., the army should assemble in 3 columns and march across the Forest of Puschdorf. Then the two infantry columns would advance next to each other directly towards the Almenhausen Wood while the third column, consisting of cavalry, would cross the clearing 1,5 km to the north. Ruesch Hussars and Malachowski Hussars would form the vanguard in front of the two infantry columns. The left infantry column would then form the right wing and the right infantry column the left wing. Two grenadier bns led each infantry column to deploy as flank guard. It was followed by the units forming the first line and then by those of the second. Holstein Dragoons would be integrated in the middle of the first infantry column.

The bridge of boat at Nassereuter was moved near the bridge of Piaten covered by men of the East Prussia Land Militia Battalion.

Wagons of the peasants would be assembled near Almenhausen to transport the wounded. The rest of the wagons and carts were loaded with knapsacks and the pack horses with tents and all were sent by the bridge to the right bank of the Pregel.

Unknown to Lehwaldt, during the night, the cavalry of the Russian vanguard took position on the road near Sittenfeldt.

The Prussians set off from their camp

On August 30 at 1:00 a.m. on August 30, earlier than ordered, the Prussian army set off from its camp at Puschdorf in three columns through the Puschdorfer Forest.

By 3:30 a.m., the Prussian had crossed the Puschdorfer Forest. The first column marched by the left and consisted of the infantry right wing, 5 dragoon squadrons and the train of artillery. The second column moved by the right and consisted of the infantry left wing. These two columns moved close to each other through the ravines at Almenhausen, which village was upon their right. Ruesch Hussars marched before both columns to cover the heads of the columns. The third column moved through another ravine and consisted of 10 hussar squadrons and 25 dragoon squadrons. They marched by the right except the hussars who moved by the left. As soon as the army got clear of the wood, the columns separated. The first column inclined to the right, the second and third to the left.

The right and left column then deployed in two lines. The first line counted 10 musketeer bns; 300 paces behind the second line consisted of 8 garrison bns; 2 grenadier bns were deployed on each flank; and the cavalry formed the wings. There were also 3 batteries (18 heavy pieces) deployed in front of the first line of infantry. The cavalry of the right wing was reinforced by the II./Schorlemmer Dragoons.

When all had formed, the Prussian army remained halted for a short time.

Lehwaldt had placed most of his cavalry on his left flank, leaving his right wing with insufficient cavalry units. He tried to correct the situation by sending five additional squadrons to reinforce the right flank.

The Russians prepare to march

Meanwhile, the Russians were perfectly still and not even one single scout was to be seen, it being at that time the custom among the Russians to withdraw their outposts at retreat-beating and not to send them out again till break of day. They now fired their réveillé gun and began their usual morning music.

In the fog, the Prussians could see nothing from the Russians, but signals and the sound of the drum could be heard coming from their camp.

In fact, the Russians were preparing to march in the direction of Eschenbruch (unidentified location). Each unit carrying provisions for three days. On the previous day, Apraxin had ordered that the vanguard under Sybilski should assemble at Sittenfeldt. The main body would follow in two columns:

  • the first column (1st Division and half the 3rd Division) would march by Norkitten, Uderballen and Albrechtsthal (present-day Sovchosnoye)
  • the second column (2nd Division and half the 3rd Division) would follow the same road as the vanguard by Sittenfeldt towards Eschenbruch.

The 1st and 2nd divisions would each provide an infantry regiment to form the rearguard of their respective column. Each column would be accompanied by its train, marching to its left. The flanks of the columns would be covered by hussar rgts and by irregular cavalry.

At the rear of the army, the rearguard proper consisted of 3 infantry rgts of the 3rd Division.

At 4:00 a.m., the Russian started their day march towards Allenburg (present-day Druzhba). The vanguard under Sybilski (4,000 horse and 15 battalions) followed by Lopukhin's 2nd Division advanced east of the Norkitten Woods while Fermor, who was supposed to form the right hand column, was still assembling his own 1st Division in column behind the Norkitten Wood. Browne's 3rd Division waited to the west of the same wood to form the rearguard of the advancing army. The Russian army was overextended on more than 3 km.

Messages arrived from the outposts that the Prussian army had advanced and deployed in order of battle.

Lehwaldt advances to contact

Lehwaldt ordered an attack of his left wing while the right wing would halt. Furthermore, he instructed units of the second line to plug any gap appearing in the first line. He also specified to his left wing to halt outside of cannon range and then to await his order before launching the attack. Finally, he instructed his cavalry to turn its attention against the Russian infantry as soon as it would have defeated the Russian cavalry.

At dawn, despite the foggy weather, the Prussian army advanced, slightly pulling to its right.

Around 4:30 a.m., the left wing paused and then rapidly advanced with drums beating. Meanwhile, the right wing directed its march towards the village of Uderballen which, as the neighbouring village of Daupelken (present-day Isvilino), had been set afire by Russian retiring outposts.

Around 5:00 a.m., the Prussians established a battery of heavy artillery to the east of Groß-Jägersdorf which opened on the Russian light cavalry and drove it back. At the same moment, Lehwaldt's two cavalry wings advanced to engage the Russian cavalry.

At 5:00 a.m., as he was getting on horse, Apraxin was informed of the advance of the Prussians. Immediately he hurried to join Leontiev's Brigade posted at the north-western edge of the Norkitten Woods. There after a brief hesitation, he ordered the vanguard to halt on the road leading to Sittenfeldt and to form a line facing the advancing Prussians; the 2nd Division to occupy the edge of the wood near 2nd Moscowskiy Infantry; and the 1st Division to extend this line to the right and to establish a Reserve with a few regiments to the north of the wood.

Meanwhile, on the news of the Prussian advance and before receiving Apraxin's new orders, the Russian vanguard had halted and deployed along the road from Norkitten to Sittenfeldt, with its right to the west of Uszbundzen and its left near Sittenfeldt. Its artillery was deployed in the middle of these positions, to the left of Arkhangelogorodskiy Infantry.

The vanguard was later joined by cavalry rgts of the other divisions who had been unable to deploy behind the wood.

The 2nd Russian Division with its baggage was already on the march behind the vanguard when the Prussian artillery opened fire. The division deployed perpendicularly to the vanguard with 4 rgts filling the gap between the road and Muldszen; and 2nd Moscowskiy Infantry posted at the débouchés of the Norkitten Woods. Two Russian field pieces planted there opened on the advancing Prussians. The rest of the 2nd Division, Villebois' Brigade, slowly advanced through the dense wood to the right of the field pieces and gradually extended the line westward along the southern edge of the Norkitten Woods. Troop movements were much hindered by the wagons and carts who had started their advance to the east of the wood.

The 1st Russian Division marched to its left to establish contact with the 2nd Division. It then turned right.

Attack of the Prussian right wing cavalry

Still around 5:00 a.m., the Prussian cavalry of the right wing (Holstein-Gottorp Dragoons and Ruesch Hussars), under the Prince of Holstein, followed in the distance by II./Schorlemmer Dragoons sent from the left wing, advanced to the south of Uderballen, planning to attack the Russian cavalry near the south-eastern corner of the Norkitten Woods. The two forward rgts drove back Russian irregular units but came under fire of the Russian infantry and pieces posted at the edge of the wood while the artillery of the Russian vanguard opened against their right flank. The two Prussian rgts were forced to turn back and to retire southwards near the Roser Wood where they rallied.

The error about the exact location of the Russian left wing now became clear. It also became evident that Russian troops occupied the road leading to Sittenfeldt.

Attack of the Prussian left wing cavalry

Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General von Schorlemmer, who was commanding the cavalry of the Prussian left wing (30 sqns) sent the Malachowski Hussars to reconnoitre the Kuthkehmen Wood, the cavalry went through it and round it. Schorlemmer's force consisted of the aforementioned hussars and of the I./Schorlemmer, Plettenberg, Platen and Finckenstein dragoon regiments.

As it debouched from the wood, Schorlemmer's Cavalry was momentarily held back by a Russian battery under Major Tyutchev, well sited at the north-west corner of the Norkitten Wood. The 1st Field Artillery Brigade of the 1st Division, Leontiev's Infantry Brigade and the hussars then advanced, hindering the fire of their own pieces.

Fermor soon removed Tyutchev's pieces planted at the north-western corner of the Norkitten Woods as he was preparing for the departure of the 1st Division despite the urgent representations of his commander. Lieutenant-General Matthäus Lieven, whose cavalry formed the end of the 1st Division, immediately recognized the threat represented by the Prussian cavalry. He redirected his cavalry and the 1st Grenadier and advanced to support the Russian right wing. The Nizegorodskiy Dragoons soon joined them. The Russian cavalry deployed in two lines in front of Leontiev's Brigade.

Soon afterwards, probably around 5:30 a.m., Schorlemmer's Cavalry (25 sqns in first line, 5 sqns in second line) attacked the Russian cavalry and drove it back. However, the Prussian then came under fire from the 1st Grenadier, Leontiev's Brigade and the 1st Field-Artillery Brigade. Nevertheless, the Finckenstein Dragoons broke through and reached the edge of the Norkitten Woods; while the Plettenberg Dragoons, under Major von Korff and Platen Dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel von Schlabrendorff, broke through the Russian lines and reached Weynothen, behind the flank of the Russian infantry.

During this time, Ivan Manteuffel's Brigade, belonging to the 3rd Russian Division and initially attached to the rearguard, deployed south of Weynothen, behind Leontiev's Brigade, facing westwards. It then opened fire on Schorlemmer's Cavalry who hindered by dams ans ditches could not advance any more. Part of it sought refuge from enemy fire in the hollow near the Pregel while Platen Dragoons hurled themselves against the Manteuffel's Brigade but were repulsed by the steady salvoes of the Russians. Platen Dragoons then retired along the edge of the woods suffering some losses from friendly fire of the Prussian battery posted on the left wing.

Schorlemmer could not depend on the support of the infantry of the Prussian left wing which was still halted. He rallied his cavalry near the Kuthkehmen Wood. It had suffered only minor losses.

Attack of the Prussian right wing

The Prussian right wing infantry finally advanced. Now that the attack of the Prince of Holstein had demonstrated the extent of the Russian left wing, the Prussian battalions redirected their marched slightly to their right to take advantage of the cover offered by the terrain to the south of Groß-Jägersdorf and Daupelken. Contact with the halted infantry left wing was soon lost. The smoke of the burning villages and the one of black powder lay on the ground and hampered visibility. Therefore, the battalions of the first line soon became separated. To re-established an uninterrupted line, Adjutant von der Golz, redeployed the battalions of the first line of the right wing in two ranks instead of the usual three under the fire of the Russian artillery. The first line fell in disorder. The two grenadier bns posted on the right flank then rejoined the first line in a new attempt to extend it.

Around 6:00 a.m., as the extended line of 8 bns of the Prussian right and the 4 bns of Garrison Regiment II Sydow deployed in second line climbed the covering hills north of Daupelken, the Russian 2nd Division opened an orderly salvo fire. Part of this division was already deployed to the south of the Norkitten Woods while the other part was still deploying.

At that moment, the 1st Russian Division took position behind Villebois' Brigade, belonging to the 2nd Division, after having marched through the Norkitten Woods. Apraxin, who personally led that section of the Russian line, considered that these fresh troops posted behind the still unshaken 2nd Division were superfluous. Accordingly, he instructed Major-General Weymarn to redeploy the 1st Division on the right of the 2nd Division to extend its right wing.

However, Apraxin's orders came too late. Kalnein Infantry and Kanitz Infantry had already outflanked the right wing of the 2nd Division and wheeled right. These two rgts then attacked the flank of the 2nd Division. They drove, one after the other, the rgts of Saltykov's Brigade of the 1st Division back into the forest where this brigade gradually rallied. Meanwhile, the 2nd Division had to give way to prevent encirclement. In this combat, the 2nd Grenadier and Narvskiy Infantry lost about 50% of their men. General-in-Chief Lopukhin fell mortally wounded while trying to rally the 2nd Grenadier. He was captured and gave the badge of his military order to a sergeant of Kanitz Infantry, as a token that he was his prisoner. Major-General Weymarn was wounded too while rallying Narvskiy Infantry. The Prussians captured the regimental guns and a few secret howitzers. The rest of the 2nd Division was attacked frontally but stood its ground.

As the Prussian infantry penetrated into the Norkitten Woods, it exposed itself to the danger of an advance of the Russian vanguard which had hitherto remained idle along the road from Uszbundzen to Sittenfeldt. To prevent this, the Prince of Holstein did not hesitate to advance once more with the 20 sqns of the Prussian right wing then deployed near the Roser Wood. He created a small reserve from the third rank of his sqns to cover his advance from attacks of the Russian irregulars. He then hurled his sqns against the Apsheronskiy Infantry and Butyrskiy Infantry deployed en potence near Sittenfeldt on the left flank of the Russian vanguard. The Cossacks were driven back towards their infantry, thus hindering its fire. Holstein's Cavalry broke through the Russian infantry, capturing eight regimental guns.

Holstein-Gottorp Dragoons then turned the left flank of the Russian vanguard as the Russian infantry wheeled and the Russian field artillery repositioned its pieces to face this new threat.

At this moment, Holstein-Gottorp Dragoons were counter-attacked and driven back by the horse grenadiers, deployed in the second line of the vanguard; supported by Kievskiy Cuirassiers and Novotroitskiy Cuirassiers, who had been detached from the Reserve.

In this attack, Holstein's Cavalry had gotten too far from the infantry and could not be properly supported by them. Accordingly, it retired to Roser Wood where it rallied. Once more, losses had been light, Holstein-Gottorp Dragoons being the most affected unit. The Prince of Holstein did not dare to launch another attack. Nevertheless, the proximity of his cavalry threatened any advance of the Russian vanguard. In itself, it was a huge success which would ultimately save the Prussian infantry from total annihilation.

Meanwhile, the heavy artillery battery planted on the right wing of the Prussian line had been quite effective against the large battery of the Russian vanguard and had been moved closer to Uderballen.

Attack of the Prussian left wing infantry

While the Prussian infantry right wing bitterly fought in the south-eastern part of the Norkitten Woods, making slow but steady progress; Lehwaldt ordered the Prussian infantry left wing, which had hitherto remained idle between Metschullen and Groß-Jägersdorf, to advance. Lieutenant-General Count Dohna led the left wing through the unoccupied north-western part of the Norkitten Woods, approaching its northern edge. General-in-Chief Browne had assembled the artillery and the infantry his 3rd Division (to the exception of Manteuffel-Zöge's Brigade which had been detached to the 2nd Division). He had deployed Nevskiy Infantry and Sibyrskiy Infantry en potence facing the Norkitten Woods. He soon reinforced them with 1st Grenadier.

The infantry of the Prussian left wing took a large battery and followed the Russians at the point of the bayonet to some distance.

At the same time, Saltykov's Brigade of the 1st Division, which had been previously driven back into the woods and had rallied, counter-attacked in the north-western part of the Norkitten Woods.

Attacked from several sides, the Prussian left wing infantry was forced to evacuate the Norkitten Woods and to retreat. Dohna was severely wounded during the fight.

Rumyantsev's counter-attacks

During this time, the Prussian right wing infantry had gradually been contained and a heavily contested hand-to-hand combat in the forest had ensued with Manteuffel-Zöge's Russian Brigade, allowing the Russians to plant heavy pieces, including “Shuvalov secret howitzers”, in advantageous positions.

Finally, Rumyantsev's Brigade, who had been kept in reserve behind the Norkitten Woods, fell on the flank of the 8 Prussian bns entangled in the woods. In the confusion, the second line of the Prussian right wing (4 bns of Garrison Regiment II Sydow) fired upon the 8 bns of the first line. In these combats, the 8 brave bns of the first line suffered a 40% loss. The defeated Prussian right wing retreated in disorder. Lehwaldt vainly tried to rally these units. Indeed the Prussian right wing was now in danger of being taken both in flank and rear and Lehwaldt decided to retire.

On the Prussian left wing, the infantry retreated in good order covered by Schorlemmer's Cavalry who tried once more to break through the Russian infantry. Here too, the Prussian infantry mistakenly fired on their own troops.

Schorlemmer's cavalry quickly rallied and covered the retreat of the infantry.

The Russian infantry advanced out of the Norkitten Woods while the Russian vanguard finally marched forward. However, the entire army halted at Groß-Jägersdorf and prepared its camp.

The Prussian army first retreated to Puschdorf, passed the bridge of boats and reached the camp of Wilkendorf. The battle had lasted for four hours.

Sybilski asked Apraxin the authorisation to pursue the retreating Prussians. The latter gave him Kargopolskiy Horse Grenadiers, Narvskiy Horse Grenadiers and Kazanskiy Cuirassiers and some Cossacks. With these troops, Sybilski followed the Prussians up to Puschdorf, capturing some colours and pieces.


The Prussians lost 123 officers, 159 non-commissioned officers, and 4,238 soldiers, and Lieutenant-General Dohna was wounded. They also lost 17 regimental guns and 11 heavy field artillery guns. The infantry regiments Kanitz (IR2), Kalnein (IR4), Garrison Regt. XI (Manteuffel), Lehwaldt (IR14), Grenadier Battalion Gohr (11/14) and Garrison Regt. II (Sydow) suffered the most losses. [Editor: most of these units were in the right wing of the Prussian infantry attack on the southern part of the Norkitten Woods] Furthermore, about 300 men deserted the Prussian army.

In this battle, the Russians captured a total of 17 battalion guns, three 24-pdrs, five 12-pdrs and three 10-pdr howitzers. They lost 38 officers and 1,449 men killed, and 240 officers and 4,262 men wounded. General Lopukhin was taken prisoner and later died of his wounds. Furthermore, generals Sybin and Kapnist had been killed; and Georg Lieven, Matthäus Lieven, Tolstoi, Villebois, Ivan Manteuffel-Zöge, Weymarn, de Bosquet and Plemiannikov, wounded.

The victory of Apraxin at Gross-Jägersdorf left the gates of East Prussia wide open to a Russian invasion. Inexplicably, Apraxin did not take advantage of this opportunity but remained idle for a while before retreating towards Poland.

Order of Battle

Prussian Order of Battle

Commander-in-chief: Field-Marshal Hans von Lehwaldt

Summary: 22 battalions, 50 squadrons, 35 battalion guns and 20 pieces of heavy artillery for a total of 24,700 men

First Line Second Line Reserve
Cavalry Right Wing under the Duke of Holstein
Infantry Right Wing under von Goltz
Infantry Left Wing under Count zu Dohna
Cavalry Left Wing under Lieutenant-General Schorlemmer

Russian Order of Battle

Commander-in-chief: Field Marshal Stepan Apraxin

  • Staff: General-in-Chief Georg von Lieven
  • General-Quartermaster: Major-General von Weywarn
  • Commander of the Artillery: Lieutenant-General Tolstoy
  • Commander of the Engineers: Major-General de Bosquet
    • Colonel of the Engineers: du Moulin
  • General du Jour: Major-General Panin

Summary: 89 battalions, 40 grenadier companies, 41 squadrons, 5 sotnias of regular cavalry, 119 sotnias of irregular cavalry, 154 battalion guns, 30 “Shuvalov secret howitzers”, 11 unicorns (10 x 1 pood, 1 x 1/2 pood) and 68 field artillery pieces taken from Riga (6 x 12-pdr guns, 12 x 8-pdr guns, 12 x 6-pdr guns, 18 x 3-pdr guns, 4 x 2-pood mortars, 8 x 1-pood howitzer, 8 x 1/2-pood howitzers) for a total of 54,800 men

First Line Second Line Third Line Reserve
Right Wing
Rearguard Cavalry (about 3,000 horse) Part of General-in-Chief Browne 3rd Division
  • Major-General Leontiev Brigade
  • Field Artillery under Tyutchev (2 batteries)
    • 1st Field battery
      • 4 x 3-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 6-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 8-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 12-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 20-pdrs howitzers
      • 1 x 40-pdrs howitzers
      • 2 x 20-pdrs unicorns
    • 2nd Field battery
      • 3 x 3-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 6-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 8-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 12-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 20-pdrs howitzers
      • 2 x 40-pdrs unicorns
Part of General-in-Chief Browne 3rd Division Part of Browne 3rd Division
  • Cossacks
    • Leonov Cossacks (??? sotnias)
    • Rychkov Cossacks (??? sotnias)
    • Sulin Cossacks (??? sotnias)
  • Andreas Manteuffel Brigade
Part of General-in-Chief Lopukhin 2nd Division Part of General-in-Chief Lopukhin 2nd Division
  • Major-General Villebois Brigade
    • Combined Grenadier Regiment (2 bns)
    • Narvskiy (3 bns + 2 gren. coys)
    • Kievskiy (3 bns + 2 gren.coys)
Part of General-in-Chief Fermor 1st Division
  • Combined Grenadier Regiment (2 bns)
  • Lieutenant-General Saltykov Brigade
  • Field Artillery (2 batteries) probably undeployed
    • 1st Field battery
      • 2 x 6-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 8-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 12-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 20-pdrs howitzers
      • 2 x 40-pdrs howitzers
      • 1 x 80-pdrs mortar
    • 2nd Field battery
      • 4 x 3-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 6-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 8-pdrs guns
      • 1 x 12-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 20-pdrs howitzers
      • 1 x 20-pdrs unicorn
Part of Fermor 1st Division
Left Wing (vanguard) under General Sibilsky
Vanguard Infantry (6,000 men, 20 regimental guns,
5 Shuvalov secret howitzers) under Lieutenant-General Wilhelm von Lieven
  • Berg Brigade
  • Field Artillery (2 batteries) from the 2nd Division
    • 1st Field Battery (20 pieces, excluding 2 pieces detached to the 2nd Battery)
      • 4 x 3-pdrs guns
      • 3 x 6-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 8-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 20-pdrs howitzers
      • 2 x 40-pdrs howitzers
      • 4 x 40-pdrs unicorns
      • 3 x 80-pdrs mortars
    • 2nd Field Battery (14 pieces including 2 pieces detached from the 1st Battery)
      • 3 x 3-pdrs guns
      • 2 x 6-pdrs guns
      • 3 x 8-pdrs guns (including 1 from the 1st Battery)
      • 2 x 12-pdrs guns (including 1 from the 1st Battery)
      • 1 x 20-pdrs howitzer
      • 1 x 40-pdrs howitzer
      • 2 x 40-pdrs unicorns
  • Schilling Brigade
Vanguard Cavalry Vanguard Cavalry Vanguard Cossacks (about 7,000 men)
  • Don Cossacks Old Command (8 rgts totaling 36 sotnias) under Brigadier Krasnoczekov
  • Don Cossacks New Command (9 rgts totaling 44 sotnias) under Serebiakov
  • Slobodian Cossacks (3 rgts totalling 29 sotnias and 10 guns) under Brigadier Kapnist
  • Ukrainian Cossacks (10 sotnias)
  • Kalmucks of the Volga (6 units)

The following units were guarding the headquarters:

The following units are listed by some authors but not located on a map of the battle. They might be part of the mixed cavalry held in reserve. We are looking for more information:


This article incorporates texts from the following books which are now in the public domain:

  • Grossen Generalstabe: Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen Part III, Der Siebenjährige Krieg, vol. IV Gross-Jägerndorf und Breslau, p. 9-13, 85-98, Anhang 24, Anlage 4
  • Tempelhoff, Fr.: History of the Seven Years' War Vol. I pp. 206-214, as translated by Colin Lindsay, Cadell, London, 1793
  • Donnersmarck, Victor Amadaeus Henckel von: Militaerischer Nachlass, Karl Zabeler, 1858
    • Relation de l'action près de Gross-Jaegerndorf, Berlin, September 1757, pp. 440-441
    • Relation de la bataille de Gross-Jaegerndorf par le feld-maréchal Apraxin, Petersbourg, October 1757, pp. 441-445

Other sources:

Dorn & Engelmann: Die Schlacten Friedrichs des Grossen, Podzun Pallas, Hanau: 1986

Duffy, Christopher: Introduction to Battle of Gross Jagersdorf - August 30, 1757, Seven Years War Association Journal,Vol. X No. 2

Konstam A. & Younghusband B.: Russian Army of the Seven Years War, Osprey, London, 1996

McLeod, Toby: A Splendid Day - Gross-Jagersdorf 1757, 18th Century Military Notes & Queries No. 5


Alessandro Colaiacomo for the compilation of the Prussian and Russian orders of battle and Tomasz Karpiński from Gniezno/Poznań for the detail on the Russian artillery