1758-06-23 - Battle of Krefeld

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Hierarchical Path: Seven Years War (Main Page) >> Battles >> 1758-06-23 - Battle of Krefeld

Allied Victory


Since the beginning of his winter offensive in Western Germany in February 1758, the Allied Army under the command of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick had first pushed back the French Army to the Rhine. Then, at the beginning of June, Ferdinand had led his army across the Rhine and initiated a campaign on the west bank of the Rhine and he was now trying to pin the French Army against the Rhine.

On June 23, Ferdinand found the French drawn up in battle order at Krefeld, close to the Rhine. The French army, under the Comte de Clermont, counted some 47,000 men while Ferdinand had 32,000 men.


Map of the Battle of Krefeld on June 23 1758.
Source: Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, volume III by the German Grosser Generalstab
Copyright Tony Flores

The battlefield extended from the west and south-west of the town of Krefeld up to a line Vorst-Anrath-Heide. The plain was covered with heather and thickets. The 10 km long “Landwehr” defensive work ran to the south and south-west of Krefeld. Its double walls measured 4 m high and 3 m. wide; the ditch located between these walls was quite deep. Furthermore, each of its wall was bordered by a smaller ditch. Therefore the Landwehr formed an important obstacle. The trees standing on the crown of the walls made it difficult for attackers to gain a good sight of the terrain behind. Another ditch ran south of the Landwehr. It was bordered by numerous small farmsteads, surrounded by deep moats with few crossings, osier-thickets, hedges, heathland, peat-bogs..

Overall, visibility was very limited on such a battlefield, especially in its southwestern part, due to the great number of small farmsteads and thickets and to the total absence of any heights. The area to the west and south-west of Krefeld was slightly more open.

Infantry movements were impaired by thickets and the height of the heathlands. Cavalry could only be used in the section between the Landwehr and the southern ditch. To the south-east of Krefeld, the broken ground excluded any troop movements.

The French army counted 74 bns and 111 sqns for a total of 34,000 foot and 13,000 horse and was posted in very advantageous positions behind the Landwehr. Clermont had detached 12 bns and some cavalry to guard the Rhine between Düsseldorf and Ürdingen. Düsseldorf itself was occupied by 14 bns. The infantry stood close to the Landwehr with its right wing anchored on a ditch west of Fischeln with the village of Ravensgät (unidentified location) and the town of Krefeld to its front; and its left wing extended to the deep wet ditch near the Holter farmstead, covered by the village of Sankt-Tönis to its front. The cavalry was encamped behind the infantry. A Grenadier Reserve of 12 bns was placed behind the right wing and another reserve (Navarre Brigade) of 6 bns behind the centre. A mixed detachment of 800 men occupied Krefeld and 400 men of the Légion Royale were posted at Anrath to secure the left wing. The French had established several passageways across the Landwehr, protected by cannon. All roads leading to the French lines were bordered with trees.

The Allied army, in its camp between Kempen and Hüls, counted 37 bns and 55 sqns for a total of 21, 700 foot (including 1,200 artillerymen), 8,800 horse and 1,400 light troops.

A frontal attack seemed impossible while the French right flank was covered by a large marsh and the left flank extended over an intricate ground as previously described. In fact, Clermont considered his positions so strong that he did not expect a frontal assault. He was more concerned for his right than for his left.

The morale of Clermont’s troops had improved but several contradictory points of view still prevailed at the headquarters, making unified command difficult.

Description of Events

Ferdinand’s Plan

Ferdinand planned to turn the French left wing at Anrath with the main body of his army. He initially intended to advance directly from Kempen against the left wing with the main body while a weaker corps would demonstrate against the front. However, he abandoned this plan, probably because of his recent experience at Rheinberg with such a far-reaching manoeuvre. He finally decided to deploy at dawn on the height of Sankt-Tönis and, only then, to make the final arrangements for the attack.

Late in the evening of June 22, the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick reported to Ferdinand about his reconnaissance. Ferdinand then retired for a short sleep in his tent pitched in the midst of his troops.

At 2:00 a.m. on June 23, Ferdinand assembled his generals and colonels in his tent. While the Allied army was making preparations for the battle, Ferdinand briefly informed his generals and colonels of the situation and of his plan for the day.

Approach of the Allies

At 4:00 a.m., leaving 1 bn of the Brunswicker Zastrow Infantry to guard the camp and baggage, Ferdinand marched out of his camp.

The left wing (13 bns, 23 sqns, several 12-pdrs, 6-pdrs, howitzers and mortars), under Lieutenant-General Spörcken would advance towards Krefeld, halting some 1,500 m from the town. The left wing was followed by Colonel Braun with several 24-pdrs and 12-pdrs and a few howitzers. On the extreme left wing, Luckner's Hussars, Scheither's Corps and the Jäger Corps would try to move through the broken ground east of Krefeld to harass the French right wing. The right wing (24 bns, 32 sqns), under Ferdinand, advanced in two columns on Sankt-Tönis.

N.B.: the Allied right wing included two converged grenadier bns (500 men each) under Lieutenant-Colonel von der Schulenburg and Lieutenant-Colonel von Schack; the left wing included 1 converged grenadier bn (600 men) under Major von Cramm.

At 6:00 a.m., the French detachment posted in Krefeld reported that an Allied column was approaching the town. However, Clermont could not believe that the Allies would dare to attack his strong positions frontally and he ignored all incoming news about their advance.

Around 6:00 a.m., Ferdinand reached Sankt-Tönis. He immediately climbed into the church steeple, accompanied by the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, the Lieutenant-General Prince of Holstein-Gottorp and General Oberg. They inspected the French positions. Ferdinand was also accompanied by some people familiar with the surrounding country. After this inspection, Ferdinand gave his orders for the attack.

Ferdinand maintained his initial decision to direct the main attack against the French left flank, where his corps would burst in upon Clermont’s rear. while his centre and left wing would make demonstration to fix the enemy.

On the left wing, Spörcken was also ordered to drive the French out of Krefeld and then to plant artillery between Krefeld and the neighbouring thickets to the west of the town and open on the French right wing to mislead Clermont in thinking that the threat was to his right and to contain the French army until the outflanking movement had succeeded. Spörcken would then act according to the results of Ferdinand main attack.

In the centre, Lieutenant-General Oberg, detached from the right wing, with 6 bns (Chevallerie, Druchtleben, Kielmannsegg, Schele, Reden and the Fusiliers) of the second line, 6 sqns (Hanoverian Leib-Regiment, Hodenberg and Bremer) and 6 x 12-pdr pieces, would proceed against the French positions between "Am Stock" and Hückelsmay according to the progress of the main attack on the right wing.

The right wing, now counting only 18 bns and 26 sqns after detaching Oberg, would then advance in the direction of Vorst and attack the French left wing near Anrath. The Hereditary Prince would lead the infantry of the right wing while Holstein-Gottorp would command the cavalry.

Around 8:00 a.m., the Allied right wing assembled at Sankt-Tönis advanced in good order. Ferdinand put himself at the head of the grenadiers and took the road leading to the village of Vorst. A French detachment retired from its outpost near Sankt-Tönis.

On the Allied left wing, Spörcken slowly advanced in two columns along the marsh of Kleud towards Krefeld.

By 9:00 a.m., the French command was aware of Oberg advance from Sankt-Tönis and Clermont was immediately informed. Nevertheless, Clermont was still convinced that the Allies would not attack and that they were merely protecting forage parties.

Around 9:00 a.m., the small French detachment posted in Krefeld evacuated the town and retired behind the Landwehr.

On the Allied left wing, Spörcken’s Corps deployed to the west of Krefeld. In the centre, Oberg’s Corps also deployed to the south of Sankt-Tönis.

On the Allied right wing, Ferdinand’s Corps laboriously continued to advance in two columns through a terrain covered with scrubs, thickets, hedges and farmsteads, leaving the village of Vorst to its right. This corps had to cross the wet ditch continuing the Landwehr to the west at Berschelsbaum. For this purpose, it had to form in small columns. The crossing considerably delayed the advance of Ferdinand’s Corps.

At 10:00 a.m., Clermont was informed that several Allied columns were in sight, marching up to his camp. He finally decided to deploy his army in front of his camp. His right extended to the wood at Fischeln from where it lined the Landwehr defensive work as far as Am Stock. The dyke was occupied by the infantry. In the centre, behind the infantry, Clermont deployed two lines of cavalry. A reserve of Carabiniers and dragoons formed en potence on the left wing; the Grenadiers de France and the Grenadiers Royaux were kept in reserve behind the right wing and Navarre Infanterie in reserve behind the centre. He also posted 4 bns towards Anrath which was already occupied by 200 foot and 200 horse of the Légion Royale.

The Prussian hussars reached Anrath. They drove the Légion Royale out of the village after a few shots.

Map of the Battle of Krefeld on June 23 1758 - Detail of the west and centre of the battlefield where the main action occurred.
Source: Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, volume III by the German Grosser Generalstab
Copyright Tony Flores

Around noon in the centre, the artillery of Oberg’s Corps opened against the French positions.

Around noon, while Clermont was deploying his army, the Légion Royale and the 4 bns which had defended Anrath fell back on their camp, after some skirmishes, gave the alarm and joined the French left wing. When Clermont realised that Ferdinand was trying to outflank his left wing, he sent 15 bns (the brigades of La Marine, Touraine, Brancas and Lochmann) under the command of Saint-Germain against him. He also deployed 30 sqns to support Saint-Germain. Clermont also recalled the detachment occupying Krefeld.

Ferdinand passed a defile and crossed woods near Anrath with his vanguard. He then slowly deployed his corps on the plain between Anrath and Willich. Visibility and movement being hindered by the numerous farmsteads and thickets, Ferdinand sent an officers to climb the church steeple and identify the most appropriate point of attack.

Saint-Germain's Corps along with its support of cavalry lined a wood running parallel a wet ditch.

Ferdinand’s Flanking Attack

Around 12:30 a.m., on the Allied left wing, the artillery of Spörcken’s Corps, planted west of Krefeld, opened on the French.

Around 1:00 p.m., artillery fire intensified to the west of Krefeld and south of Sankt-Tönis. There was no longer any doubt that the French were facing a serious attack, and Clermont had his army in arms. Nevertheless, Clermont himself resumed his dinner.

At 1:00 p.m., on the Allied right wing, Ferdinand moved his artillery forward, allowing his infantry to form against a wood and Malachowski Hussars to extend on his right towards the village of Willich as if to turn the French left flank. Bock Dragoons were kept behind the right of the infantry.

At 2:00 p.m., accompanied by Prince Xavier of Saxony, Clermont finally joined his troops and immediately ordered his Reserve to reinforce the right wing which he considered as the most seriously threatened.

Around ??, Oberg’s Corps advanced on two passages on the Landwehr at Am Stock and Hückelsmay.

Finally, by 2:00 p.m., Ferdinand’s Corps had completed deployment. It advanced in the direction of Heide (probably Niederheide). When Ferdinand’s troops reached the Holter farmstead, they wheeled to attack the French left wing.

Meanwhile, the Prince of Holstein-Gottorp with the cavalry (excluding Bock Dragoons who remained with the infantry) marched from Anrath in the direction of Heide without meeting any opposition. Holstein-Gottorp then halted south of Votzhöfe. Meanwhile the Hereditary Prince with his grenadiers and Bock Dragoons covered the march of the infantry who had deployed in two lines to the north-east of Anrath.

Around 2:30 p.m., Ferdinand’s artillery opened. The French pieces, who had been hurriedly sent to the French left wing, answered.

Around 3:00 p.m., as lively fire could be heard from the direction of the French left wing, Prince Xavier mentioned to Clermont that it was typical of the Prussians to direct all their efforts against a wing and to make demonstrations with part of their troops in front. In the present case, Prince Xavier thought that their main attack was directed against the French left wing.

After a lively cannonade, Ferdinand realised that he would have to oust the 15 French bns from the wood by a direct attack. The Hereditary Prince put himself at the head of the first line (Schulenburg and Schack converged grenadiers battalions, Block, Spörcken, Hardenberg, Wangenheim, Post, Dreves) and advanced drums beating against the Holter farmstead and the neighbouring farmsteads. They were received by the lively fire of the La Marine Brigade (6 bns) which had been initially deployed on the left wing of the French second line but had been redirected to the farmsteads and thickets on its flank.

The contest for the Holter farmstead lasted for 45 minutes before the Hereditary Prince finally managed to drive the French back and to make himself master of these farmsteads. But before he could reorganize his troops to resume his advance, the La Marine Brigade received new reinforcements. Indeed, the 9 other bns of Saint-Germain’s Division joined the heroic brigade. Then the 15 bns of Saint-Germain’s Division (7,000 men) counter-attacked. Once again a furious combat began in the farmsteads and thickets along the deep wet ditch. The 4,500 men of first line of the Hereditary Prince were in very favorable defensive positions. Nevertheless, the Hereditary Prince had to commit his second lines (approx. 4,500 men) to finally gain the upper hand.

While the infantry combat raged around the Holter farmstead, Ferdinand received a message from the officer posted in a tower in Anrath informing him that French troops were on the march from Fischeln. Ferdinand realised that he should rapidly obtain a decision on his right wing before the arrival of these reinforcements. At about the same time, he received a second message informing him that an unoccupied passage over the wet ditch had been discovered a few hundreds paces east of the place where his infantry was fighting Saint-Germain’s Division.

Meanwhile, on the Allied left wing, unsure of the outcome of Ferdinand’s attack against the French left flank, Spörcken did not dare to launch a frontal assault against the French troops posted behind the Landwehr. Major von Bülow, one of Ferdinand’s adjutants, vainly tried to convince him to attack. Furthermore, a hussar brought the news that the initial attack of the Allied right wing had been repulsed. Spörcken immediately gave orders for a retreat and sent the Hanoverian Foot Guards (2 bns) to support Oberg’s Corps which he considered to be in serious danger.

At 5:00 p.m., Clermont, realizing that the decisive action of the battle would take place on his left wing, sent for the Reserve (Grenadiers de France, Grenadiers Royaux, Navarre Brigade), deployed behind his right wing near Krefeld and behind his centre, to march to the support of Saint-Germain's Corps. However, these reserve units were quite distant from the left wing and Clermont's courier lost precious time locating it.

At about 5:00 p.m., the Hereditary Prince, assisted by Wangenheim and Kielmannsegg, launched his grenadiers in an attack on the two ditches defended by the French in the wood, forcing both of them. The grenadiers were imitated by the other battalions all along the line.

Around 5:00 p.m. Ferdinand sent orders to the Prince of Holstein-Gottorp to cross the wet ditch at the newly discovered passage and to attack the rear of the French infantry.

Between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., with 2 sqns of Holstein Dragoons and 2 sqns of Finckenstein Dragoons, General von Bandemer crossed the wet ditch at the unguarded passage near Engershof and advanced north-eastwards. His appearance in the rear of Saint-Germain’s infantry spread panic in the French ranks and contributed significantly to the victory of the Hereditary Prince in this endless infantry combat.

Saint-Germain’s infantry, which had bore the brunt of the fighting and sustained heavy casualties, retired to the open heath under the fire of the Allies. Saint-Germain’s troops, without being reinforced, had fought for almost 3 hours, defending the crossing of the ditch and the possession of the hamlets alongside this serious obstacle. Three successive Allied attacks had been necessary to finally repulse them. Ferdinand even had had to commit the his second line of infantry.

The Allies then secured the passages on the wet ditch.

In the Allied centre, when Oberg was informed of the success of the Hereditary Prince, he launched his corps against the passages at Am Stock and Hückelsmay. The French, threatened on both flanks, soon abandoned these lines. Oberg got over the Landwehr at Hückelsmay with his infantry and at Am Stock with his cavalry.

The timely arrival of the French Carabiniers (10 sqns) prevented Saint-Germain’s infantry to break. The corps of the Hereditary Prince was still reorganizing after its long struggle in the farmsteads.

Meanwhile, the Prince of Holstein-Gottorp with his cavalry had taken position south of Votzhöfe, covered by thickets. Only the Malachowski Hussars had received orders to advance further and to create confusion in the rear of the French positions. However, the deep, water-filled ditches thwarted this attempt.

On the Allied left wing, broken ground prevented Hanoverian light troops to make any progress.

Cavalry Combat

On the Allied extreme right wing, Bandemer’s cavalry was now facing a vastly superior body of French cavalry. His 4 sqns were charged in front and flank by the 10 sqns of the Carabiniers and driven back to Engerhof and Bötgeshof with significant loss.

Meanwhile, Major-General von Urff had crossed the wet ditch at Engerhof at the head of his own Leib-Regiment and of the Leib-Dragoner. He countercharged the pursuing Carabiniers and brought them to a halt but could not achieve a greater success because his sqns were not yet fully deployed.

Ferdinand had repeatedly sent orders to the Hereditary Prince to advance from the wet ditch into the plain but the latter entangled in combat for hours could not execute them. Ferdinand finally rode to the positions of the Hereditary Prince.

Prinz Karl Infantry defending against the French Carabiniers - Source: Richard Knötel

When Ferdinand reached his destinations he saw Major-General von Gilsa advancing towards the French cavalry with 4 reorganised Hanoverian bns (including Post, Dreves and possibly Hardenberg) and 2 Hessian bns (including Prinz Carl). The young Comte de Gisors commanding the Carabiniers charged them at the head of 4 of his sqns. The Allied infantry fired a devastating volley when the Carabiniers were approx. at 30 paces, mowing down in an instant most of their first rank including Gisors who fell mortally wounded. A single squadron managed to break through but the third rank of infantry coolly made an about turn and knocked it down with its disciplined fire. During the charge, Ferdinand himself had been endangered and had sought protection from the French cavalry in the ranks of his infantry.

Meanwhile, confusion in orders had sent the French Reserve towards the centre to reinforce the troops posted behind the Landwehr.

At this moment, the Prince of Holstein-Gottorp arrived with his cavalry who had just crossed the wet ditch.

The Hessian Leib-Regiment and Leib-Dragoner advanced for a second time against the French Carabiniers who had meanwhile been reinforced by the Royal-Roussillon and Aquitaine cavalry brigades. The French cavalry could now field 18 sqns (excluding the 4 sqns of Carabiniers already committed against the Allied infantry).

The two leading Hessian cavalry regiments were followed by Prinz Wilhelm Cavalry, Miltitz Cavalry, Holstein Dragoons and Finckenstein Dragoons. Thus the cavalry combat to the north-east of Engerhof opposed 20 Allied sqns to 18 French sqns.

A number of sqns of the Carabiniers and Royal-Roussillon were immediately driven back. The Leib-Dragoner captured two standards; Colonel von Stein at the head of Prinz Wilhelm Cavalry captured a third standard; and the Holstein Dragoons, a fourth and a pair of kettle-drums. The remaining French sqns were also routed. They rallied to the rear near other regiments which had been kept in reserve. The Allied artillery had significantly contributed to the success of the Allied cavalry.

Clermont twice ordered the French cavalry reserve to counter-attack but it refused to engage.

During the cavalry combat, the Hereditary Prince had deployed his infantry north of the wet ditch. He soon effected a junction with Oberg’s Corps which took position on his left wing.

French Retreat

By 6:30 p.m., the victorious Allied right wing and centre were advancing when M. de Saint-Pern finally arrived on the French left wing at the head of the 18 bns of the French Reserve (Navarre Brigade and 3 grenadier brigades, including the Grenadiers de France). Prince Xavier of Saxony joined the grenadier brigades and was preparing to launch a counter-attack when Clermont ordered a general retreat and instructed the grenadiers to cover the army. Even considering their late arrival, these 18 bns, if they had been supported by some fresh cavalry, could have changed the course of the battle.

Saint-Pern's inexplicable delay before coming to the rescue of Saint-Germain was attributed by certain to treachery within the French high commands.

Prince Xavier occupied the thickets along a ditch to the south-west of Fischeln.

Ferdinand’s and Oberg’s corps advanced against the positions of the French grenadiers who had time to cross the ditch and take new positions behind it before retreating towards Neuss.

Ferdinand’s artillery opened on the retiring French troops. Ferdinand also sent part of his cavalry to pursue them, but the broken terrain did not allow them to catch up with the French.

Around 7:00 p.m. on the Allied left wing, Bülow finally convinced Spörcken to send a few bns of his extreme left wing towards the Landwehr. They found the positions and the village of Fischeln already abandoned by the French.

Late in the evening, when Ferdinand personally went to meet Spörcken, the latter’s troops were still near Krefeld. Ferdinand soon ordered Spörcken to advance his infantry to the Landwehr and to send his cavalry to pursue the French beyond Fischeln. But nothing significant could be accomplished before darkness.

The inactivity of Spörcken’s Corps on the Allied left wing ruined any chance of transforming this Allied victory into a crushing defeat for Clermont.

Clermont retreated unmolested towards Neuss and then to Worringen.

At 9:00 p.m., the three Allied corps joined each other on the battlefield and spent the night under arms. Meanwhile, the Allied light troops were sent forward to harass the retiring French Army.

Ferdinand personally went to Krefeld. Most wounded were brought to Krefeld. A filed hospital abandoned by the French at Fischeln was put to good use.


During this battle, the French had lost some 4,200 men killed, wounded or taken prisoners; however, 2,000 of them belonged to Saint-Germain’s Division which initially counted 7,000 men. French losses also included some of their best cavalry, the Carabiniers alone suffering some 60 officers and 600 men casualties. Among the wounded were the Comte de Gisors, son of Maréchal de Belle-Isle; the Chevalier de Muy; Lieutenant-General Comte de Maille, colonel of Condé regiment; the Duc de Montmorency, colonel of Touraine Infanterie; the Comte de Lauraguais, colonel of the Roussillon regiment; Colonel Lochmann, Lieutenant-Colonel Escher, 4 captains, 17 officers of the same regiment. About 8 French regiments were entirely ruined.

The Allies had captured 2 colours, 5 standards, 2 pairs of kettle-drums and 8 cannon. A pair of kettle-drums was given to the Hessian artillery because it had been captured by the gunners of Prinz Karl Infantry. The other pair of kettle-drums, taken from Royal-Roussillon Cavalerie by the Holstein Dragoons was given to them. The Leib-Dragoner had captured 2 Carabiniers standards, Colonel Stein of the Prinz Wilhelm Cavalry, a third one and the Holstein Dragoons a fourth.

The Allies had lost 10 officers and 302 men, killed; 40 officers and 1,182 men, wounded; and 2 officers and 77 men, missing. The two Hanoverian rgts Block and Dreves had suffered the most, each losing approx. 200 men.

Order of Battle

Allied Order of Battle

Commander-in-chief: General of Infantry Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick-Lüneburg

Summary: 37 battalions, 55 squadrons and 3 units of light troops for a total of 21,700 foot (including 1,200 artillerymen), 8,800 horse, and 1,400 light troops.

Right Wing under Ferdinand of Brunswick

Centre under Lieutenant-General von Oberg assisted by Major-Generals von Dachenhausen, Diepenbroick and Druchtleben

Left Wing under the Lieutenant-General von Spörcken assisted by Lieutenant-General von Wutginau and Major-Generals von Fürstenberg and Prince von Anhalt-Bernburg

French Order of Battle

Commander-in-chief: General Comte de Clermont

Summary: some 47,000 men (34,000 foot and 13,000 horse) in 74 bns, 111 sqns, 3 bns of artillery, 2 miner coys and 18 coys of light troops.

First Line Second Line
Right Wing of cavalry under the Marquis d'Armentières Right Wing of cavalry under Duc de Sourches
All infantry under Marquis de Contades All infantry under Chevalier de Nicolay
Right Wing of infantry under M. de Chevert Right Wing of infantry under Duc de Havré
Centre under Comte de Guerchy
Left Wing of infantry under Comte de Lorges Left Wing of infantry under the Lieutenant-General Comte de Saint-Germain
Left Wing of cavalry under Duc de Fitzjames Left Wing of Cavalry under Chevalier de Muy


Artillery under Lieutenant-General de Vallière

Hussars under Brigadier Comte de Turpin

Light Troops probably under the Mestre de Camp Comte de Chabot


This article incorporates texts from the following books which are now in the public domain:

  1. Grosser Generalstab Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II: Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, Part 3 Der siebenjährige Krieg 1756-1763, Vol. 7 Olmütz und Crefeld, Berlin, 1909, pp. 168-183
  2. Jomini, Henri, Traité des grandes opérations militaires, 2ème édition, 2ème partie, Magimel, Paris: 1811, pp. 29-37
  3. Carlyle T., History of Friedrich II of Prussia vol. 18
  4. Anonymous, A Complete History of the Present War, from its Commencement in 1756, to the End of the Campaign, 1760, London, 1761, pp. 299-302
  5. Hotham, The operations of the Allied Amy under the command of his Serene Highness Prince Ferdinand Duke of Brunswic and Luneberg beginning in the year 1757 and ending in the year 1762, London: T. Jefferies, 1764, pp. 46-47

Other sources

Horse and Musket Users Group

Rohan Chabot, Alix de, Le Maréchal de Belle Isle ou la revanche de Foucquet, Perrin, Paris, 2005

Rogge, Christian, The French & Allied Armies in Germany during the Seven Years War, Frankfurt, 2006

Vial, J. L., Nec Pluribus Impar