1759-11-20 - Battle of Maxen

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Hierarchical Path: Seven Years War (Main Page) >> Battles and Encounters >> 1759-11-20 - Battle of Maxen

Austrian Victory

Prelude to the Battle

From July 1759, Austro-Imperial forces proceeded to the invasion of Saxony, capturing Dresden and several other cities. Prince Heinrich soon led a counter-offensive, which allowed him to retake possession of most Saxon towns to the exception of Dresden.

On November 13, Frederick II arrived from Silesia where he had operated against a Russian army (see operations in Lower Silesia in 1759) and made a junction with the corps of Prince Heinrich. Field-Marshal Count Leopold Daun, the commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, gradually retired towards Dresden, closely followed by Prussian forces.

On November 15, Frederick detached Finck's Corps to Maxen to cut off the communications of the Austrian Army with Bohemia. However, this manoeuvre placed Finck in an isolated position. Daun resolved to encircle and attack Finck's isolated corps.


Map of the battle of Maxen -
Source: Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, volume III by the German Grosser Generalstab
Copyright Tony Flores

Map of the battle of Maxen - Source: Tielke – Copyright: MZK Brno
Elevation of the battlefield of Maxen - Source: Tielke – Copyright: MZK Brno

The Müglitz River flowed northwards through a deep forest valley carved in the foothills of the Erzgebirge, before turning northeastwards in the direction of the Elbe as it met the very irregular plateau of Maxen, bordering its left bank. This plateau gradually flattens out towards the north, crossed by several small depressions. However, it drops steeply southeastwards in the direction of the Müglitz and westwards in the direction of the Grimmische Wasser flowing from Reinhardtsgrimma.

From the valleys of the Müglitz and Grimmische Wasser, the rugged wooden slopes of the plateau rise sharply. With the exception of a few paths, these slopes were impassable by troops. The strongly protruding Height 394.9 rises southwest of the village of Maxen, which is located at its foot. A flat, wide hill lies in front of it to the south (Height 385.3). It sloped westwards towards a brook flowing from Hausdorf and eastwards to the Müglitz Valley. Because of this hill, the Prussians posted around Maxen had no line of sight in the direction of the Hausdorf Valley. High hills rose to the west and southeast of Hausdorf. Height 396.8 is located east of this village. It is separated from the plateau of Maxen by the steep banks of a brook that flows northwest from Hausdorf to the Grimmische Wasser. The northern foothills (Heide-Berg and Dreiberg) of Height 418.3, located southeast from Hausdorf, towered over the flat top of the aforementioned Height 385.3. To the south of Hausdorf, a forest strip stretched from the Müglitz to the Grimmische Wasser, it formed the southern limit of the battlefield.

An attacker, who had managed to cross the difficult gullet near Reinhardtsgrimma, could approach the Prussian positions and deploy under the cover of the aforementioned forest strip and of the heights around Hausdorf. However, the slopes are steep and in some places difficult to climb, even for infantry. Furthermore, at that time of the year, the terrain was covered with frozen snow and ice, making the ascent even more difficult. However, if an attacker could establish batteries on these heights, he would benefit from excellent artillery positions. The rugged terrain also made it easier for his infantry to advance, since it could not be seen from the plateau of Maxen. The broad Height 385.3 then offered an excellent cover to deploy troops, and the southern steep slope of the Maxener Höhe still enabled the orderly deployment of a larger numbers of troops, and even the movements of regular cavalry. The Heide-Berg and the Dreiberg, which overlooked the flat top of Height 385.3 allowed the artillery to support the attack of the infantry until the last moment. The valleys of the Müglitz and Grimmische Wasser also made it possible to encircle the southern front of the defenders on both flanks; any unit advancing in this area would soon reach cover and could, wherever the slope was practicable, move closer to the main point of attack.

Initial deployment

On Monday November 19 at 7:00 a.m., O'Donell's corps, personally led by Daun, quitted Rippien and marched directly on Dippoldiswalde. The movement was initially hidden by a heavy fog. When the fog lifted, Finck resolved to detach Platen with 5 bns and 5 sqns to occupy Reinhadrtsgrimma on the Heights of Hausdorf. A bread-convoy reached Finck's positions and was able to safely get home, though under annoyances from cannonading in the distance. Finck, from his observation post on a hilltop, saw Daun's vanguard approaching Dippoldiswalde and cannonading his meal-carts. All that day, Finck did his best to prepare his corps and saw his numerous enemies settle round him. Finck completely ascertained where the enemy's three attacks were to be: from Dippoldiswalde, Tronitz and Dohna. Daun, with his main force of 27,000 men, took camp on the Heights of Malter near Dippoldiswalde with his left at Oberhäslich while Stolberg took position at Burkhardswalde on the eastern side of Maxen with 7 bns and 5 sqns. Daun also threw 3 bns into the town of Dippoldiswalde. Once his army safely encamped, Daun returned to Dresden for the night to see if Frederick II had undertaken any manoeuvre.

Finck prepared his positions for defence. Wunsch was left on the heights between Dohna and Ploschwitz with 5 bns and 3 sqns to cover the rear of the Prussian positions and contain the Reichsarmee. The rest of Finck's Corps 13 bns, 32 sqns) deployed in a crescent shaped line around Maxen. From this force, 7 bns were the remains of as many infantry regiments that had badly suffered at the Battle of Kunersdorf. Similarly, out of the 4 grenadier bns, 1 bn regrouped the remnants of 2 depleted bns. Rebentisch Infantry was the only nearly complete infantry regiment, but it included Austrian and Russian prisoners of war who had decided to join the Prussian service. The cavalry was numerous (approx. 4,000 horse) and in good condition. The Jung-Platen Dragoons and the Gersdorff Hussars had behaved superbly on every occasion since the beginning of the campaign. But the horses of the Prussian cavalry, like those of the Austrians, were not rough shod, and were of little use in this mountainous terrain covered with black ice and snow.

Finck’s line extended from Mühlbach to the Heights of Wittgensdorf. Lindstedt, who had retired from Dippoldiswalde in front of the approaching Corps of Sincère, now covered the right of the Prussian positions with 4 bns on the Heights of Schmorsdorf.

Description of Events

On November 20 at 7:00 a.m., the Austrian main body set out from its encampment near Dippoldiswalde and marched in 4 columns: 2 infantry columns in the centre and 2 cavalry columns on the wings. The advanced guards, consisting of the Szechényi Hussars with some squadrons of carabiniers, some Grenzer light troops and a grenadier brigade of 5 bns under FML Siskovics, advanced on Reinhardtsgrimma. Major-General von Seckendorf with a small detachment (2 bns, 3 sqns) was left behind on the heights south of Malter to cover the rear of the main body

Field Marshal Daun, accompanied by Quartermaster-General Lacy and the two Saxon princes Albrecht and Clemens, repaired to Sincère's Corps as the head of the columns reached Reinholdshain.

At daybreak, General von Finck arrived at Reinhardtsgrimma and ordered generals von Platen and von Mosel to retire behind Hausdorf if attacked. Finck then rode back to Maxen.

Daun deployed Sincère's Corps in 2 lines near Reinhadrtsgrimma and reconnoitred the Prussian positions. Daun also instructed Brentano to advance from Röhrsdorf. The Prussian had occupied Reinhadrtsgrimma with 3 sqns of Gersdorff Hussars. General Platen was posted behind the village with 2 bns where there was a narrow gullet overhung with heights all round. Furthermore, the gullet was rendered very difficult by the frost and some little snow. The heights were steep and extremely slippery. Many thought that it was impossible to proceed with the artillery and cavalry, particularly as the horses were not rough shod.

Daun sent the Szechényi Hussars, some Grenzer light troops and one grenadier battalion against the Prussian occupying Reinhadrtsgrimma. As instructed, the two Prussian generals then evacuated their positions near Reinhardtsgrimma.

Meanwhile, a detachment of 200 Grenzer light troops and 100 hussars belonging to Brentano’s Corps appeared near Kirchbach. It seemed that the Austro-Imperials planned to turn the right flank of Finck’s positions.

Platen’s and Mosel’s troops retreated through the forest to Hausdorf. The Gersdorff Hussars under Major von Haugwitz, delayed the advance of the enemy and then followed the rest of the detachment to Hausdorf.

While the Austrian vanguard reached the north-eastern edge of the forest near Hausdorf, the main body deployed in four columns, ready to advance. The two inner columns consisted of infantry and were placed under the command of FZM Sincere. The attack would be conducted in columns of battalions (each battalion in line one behind the other). The cavalry formed the two outer columns. Major Fabri, an Austrian engineer, had assured Daun that the gullet behind Reinhadrtsgrimma was difficult but practicable.

Meanwhile, a hussar patrol had informed Finck that an enemy column (belonging to Brentano’s Corps) had advanced by way of Röhrsdorf and taken position on the heights south of this village. Furthermore, General von Wunsch informed him that troops belonging to the Reichsarmee were advancing against his positions. Soon afterwards, the sound of the guns could be heard coming from the vicinity of Dohna. Finch then ordered his corps to strike tents and to occupy the chosen defensive positions. 5 bns (including the 4 bns previously posted near Reinhardtsgrimma and the hill near Hausdorf) should take position on the big height southwest of Maxen, facing towards Hausdorf. The Württemberg Dragoons and 3 sqns of hussars would take position behind these 5 bns, out of sight of the attackers. Another bn would cover the left flank, facing Mühlbach. On the right flank, 3 bns faced northwestwards. Most of the cavalry under Major-General von Bredow was deployed to their right, with 3 cuirassier rgts in first line and Jung-Platen Dragoons and 4 hussar sqns in second line. Major-General von Lindstedt was posted with 3 bns on the Scheer-Berg, west of Schmorsdorf. Another bn was posted on the slope overlooking the Müglitz, to the east of Maxen to cover the rear of Finck’s Corps. From the heavy artillery, 4 twelve-pdrs had already been sent to Major-General Wunsch; the rest was deployed in two batteries facing Hausdorf, 2 twelve-pdrs on the right flank and 2 on the Scheer-Berg. The baggage were assembled in a gullet south of the Scheer-Berg.

Main Austrian attack

The Prussian troops returning from Reinhardtsgrimma deployed in these positions: the 2 bns of Zastrow Fusiliers and Grabow Fusiliers on the heights on each side of Hausdorf. They tried to stop the first elements of the Austrian vanguard now appearing at the edge of the forest to the southwest of their positions. The Prussian hussars engaged the Austrian hussars. This skirmish lasted a long time, because the Austrians were seriously delayed by the difficult terrain. The heavy artillery, in particular, crossed the various gullies with great difficulties.

Daun finally ordered the 4 columns forward towards Maxen. Once the foremost Austrian grenadier bns had finally passed the gullet near Reinhadrtsgrimma and immediately gained Height 418.3 to the southeast of Hausdorf, Daun could have a look at the area through which his corps would attack. He then halted the grenadier battalions just before they reached the summit of the hill to keep them under cover and established a battery (8 x 12-pdrs) on this height to fire on the 2 Prussian bns deployed on each side of Hausdorf. These 2 bns retired towards the main position, followed by Haugwitz’s hussars.

The Austrian vanguard then advanced through Hausdorf and occupied the Heide-Berg. It then took position in the wooded gullies on both sides of the Heide-Berg, which could not be taken under fire from the plateau near Maxen. Meanwhile, the Austrian columns emerged from the forest, skillfully using the terrain to remain under cover, and followed the vanguard.

The Austrian artillery advanced and soon several batteries crowned the Dreiberg, the Heide-Berg and Height 396.8 to the northwest of Hausdorf. The Austrian infantry occupied Height 385.3.

General Finck had occupied the Heights of Maxen with 3 bns, 4 howitzers and 5 twelve-pdr guns. Platen was at Hausdorf with 2 bns and the rest of the Prussian Corps was drawn up facing north against Brentano. On the little round hill on the right of Maxen, there was a Prussian battery of 4 six-pdr guns. Two other Prussian batteries (2 twelve-pdr guns each) were opposed to Brentano's Corps.

Captain Schroder of the Austrian artillery brought up 8 twelve-pdrs on to the height where the Austrian grenadier battalions waited. Daun then established a battery who covered the deployment of his army, playing on the Prussian left flank and doing great execution.

At 2:00 p.m., the cannonade began. The Prussian artillery answered, with the support of the battalion guns of the infantry deployed south of Maxen, which suffered some losses. Grenzer light troops, previously hidden in defiles on each side of the Prussian positions, came out of these defiles and opened fire on the Prussians.

Since the [Seydlitz Hussars|Gersdorff Hussars]] and the Württemberg Dragoons, who were deployed a few hundred paces behind the Prussian infantry, suffered losses too and were becoming restless, General von Gersdorff let them retire behind Maxen. Fires erupted in various places as grenades shot by the Austrian howitzers kept falling on the thatched houses of the village.

Around this time, a wild commotion was heard from the area northeast of Maxen. It came from the panicked crews and horses of the Prussian baggage, which had been hidden in a gully south of the Scheer-Berg, as Austrian cannon balls tore through the mass of horses and wagons assembled there. In a confused mass, they came out of the gully and scattered in the rear of the Prussian lines over the narrow plateau.

While these events took place at the southwestern edge of the plateau of Maxen, Brentano had reached Wittgensdorf and was cannonading Finck with 8 eight-pdrs. Austro-Imperial batteries also opened a lively fire near Dohna.

Around 3:30 p.m., Daun decided to launch an attack with his infantry, which stood ready in cover on the southern slope of Height 385.3 and in the neighbouring gullies. The 5 Austrian grenadier bns of the vanguard closely followed by the other troops resumed their advance in columns of battalions out of the wood, with their cavalry in column of squadrons on their left, and began to form. Daun ordered 8 howitzers and 6 six-pdrs to be brought up on to the height to the right. He also formed a battery of 25 guns which soon opened against the Prussian lines.

FML Siskovics with the column formed by the 5 Austrian grenadier bns of the vanguard, supported by d'Aynse's and Dombasle's Brigades, attacked the Prussian line on the heights in front of Wittgensdorf and Maxen. After a short firefight at close range, they attacked the thin Prussian line at the point of the bayonet.

The quick fire of Grenadier Battalion Kleist, Grenadier Battalion Billerbeck and Grenadier Battalion Benckendorff managed to repel the attack and the Austrians stopped and began to fire.

The Austrians finally managed to break through in the centre of the Prussian line, where Grabow Fusiliers and Zastrow Fusiliers, which had been engaged in combat since the morning, stood.

Lieutenant-General von Finck sent orders to the Württemberg Dragoons to attack. They trotted through Maxen, deployed and advanced against the enemy. Colonel von Münchow, who commanded the regiment, fell mortally wounded. His men hesitated and were soon thrown into disorder by the routing Prussian infantry. They then all took refuge in the village, with the Austrians closely followed them.

Meanwhile, Grenadier Battalion Willemey, which was posted near Steinhübel east of Maxen, had rushed towards the village and General von Finck had ordered Rebentisch Infantry as well as Jung-Platen Dragoons to contain the attack.

Grenadier Battalion Willemey reached Maxen as the Austrians were penetrating into the village, and drove them out of it. However, Rebentisch Infantry was defeated, its second battalion being cut to pieces by the Austrian cavalry, which had just join the fight. It joined the routing Prussian units. The Jung-Platen Dragoons were greeted with lively fire. Nevertheless, they managed in some places to attack the Austrian grenadiers but were soon thrown into disorder and forced to retire.

The Grenadier Battalion Billerbeck , Grenadier Battalion Kleist and Finck Infantry were surrounded. The Billerbeck and Kleist bns were saved by a charge of the Grenadier Battalion Willemey and held their ground in Maxen, where the advance of the Austrians momentarily came to a halt.

The entire Prussian left wing was now isolated for the right wing and had to force its way to retire on Schmorsdorf.

Daun reformed his lines on the heights of Maxen and linked his left to Brentano's positions.

Brentano’s Attack

Brentano’s Corps had taken position between Wittgensdorff and Tronitz. His Grenzer light troops, using the defiles leading from Wittgensdorff and Lungwitz to the heights, had advanced against the Prussian right wing , which was deployed west of Maxen and in danger of being caught between two fires. Major-General von Bredow decided to advance with his cavalry to prevent such a danger.

While the Prussian artillery of the right wing directed its fire on the Austrian troops deployed near Wittgensdorff, Bredow’s 15 cuirassier sqns, followed by the hussars, advanced in good order. They had trotted forward about 800 paces, when their left wing started receiving fire from the light troops posted in the defiles to the southwest of Wittgensdorff. This wing then inclined to the right, as this movement continued, the direction of the attack was gradually modified.

As the Prussian cuirassiers crossed the terrain to the southwest of Tronitz, which was covered by several ponds, disorder increased, and when the grapeshots of the Austrian artillery struck the squadrons, the whole mass of cavalry broke and fled towards Sürssen, pursued by Brentano’s cavalry.

Once the Prussian cuirassiers had reached the area between Sürssen and Ploschwitz, their officers managed to bring them to a halt. General von Wunsch, who had just joined them, vainly tried to lead them against the Austrians once more. Disorder was too great and it took him a long time to rally them.

In the area south of Röhrsdorf, a few Prussian cavalry detachments, which had their lost their way, fell into the hands of Pálffy’s Hussar Brigade, the Splényi Hussars capturing two standards.

Brentano then resumed his advance.

Evacuation of Maxen

Dusk of this short November day was already falling. Finck realized that it was impossible to hold any longer his compromised positions at Maxen. He decided to assemble his troops on the Scheer-Berg, to the southwest of Schmorsdorf, where he still had 3 fresh bns under Major-General von Lindstedt. However, he had not enough time to execute his plan.

Grenadier Battalion Benckendorff, Grenadier Battalion Willemey and Finck Infantry, which, under Major-General von Rebentisch, had bravely defended Maxen, now saw themselves surrounded on all sides and had to force their way back to avoid capture. However, only a few men managed to join Lindstedt’s Brigade.

At about the same time, the Prussian units deployed west of Maxen, were surrounded. The Prussian cavalry prepared to attack the advancing Austrians but was itself attacked and defeated by the Austrian cavalry. As soon as the Prussian cavalry was driven back, these Austrian dragoons charged the Prussian infantry, capturing 2 battalions with their colours and some guns. The Prussians broke and fled in the direction of Dohna. Only a few units managed to retire in good order. Schenckendorff Infantry under Major von Isselstein formed a square and tried to retire, harassed by the Austrian cavalry. Jung-Modena Dragoons dispersed the rest of Finck’s regiments. Most of the Prussian artillery fell into the hands of the Austrians.

Meanwhile, the Reichsarmee contingent had also advanced:

  • Palfy, at the head of Splényi Hussars and Hadik Hussars, from Zehista towards Dohna
  • Kleefeld, leading some Grenzer light troops from Zoschendorf
  • Stolberg, at the head of his own brigade, at Burkhardswalde

Palfy and Kleefeld managed to pass the ravine with their light troops. Palfy then ordered the Splényi Hussars to fall on the flank of Finck's retreating corps. Palfy and Kleefeld then made a junction with Brentano's Corps, thus enclosing Finck's Corps on that side. Two Austrian cavalry regiments were sent towards the Elbe to prevent the Prussians getting off on that side.

Finck retires towards Falkenhain

The routers finally took refuge in the village of Schmorsdorf and the adjoining forest of Hahnewald. Here Lindstedt’s Brigade resisted the advance of the Austrians for a while, allowing the defeated Prussian troops time to retire northeastwards.

Lieutenant-Colonel von Petersdorff with the rest of Lehwaldt Infantry held Schmorsdorf until nightfall. They then evacuated the village which was immediately occupied by the Austrians. During this time, the remnants of Finck’s Corps tried to assemble in the area of Falkenhain and Ploschwitz, where Wunsch’s detachment had been posted since the beginning of the battle.

For Wunsch’s detachment, the engagement had until then been limited to a cannonade, because the Imperial troops of the Prince von Stolberg had remained idle on both sides of Müglitz. However, Wunsch had evacuated Dohna in the morning and Grenzer light troops belonging to Kleefeld’s Corps had occupied the village.

Major-General von Kleefeld had let his Grenzer light troops advance by way of Sürssen against the flank of Wunsch’s detachment posted on the heights near Ploschwitz. However, a counterattack led by Colonel von Wolfersdorff at the head of the Hessen-Kassel Fusiliers and the Freibataillon Salenmon had soon driven them back. Consequently, by nightfall, Wunsch’s detachment was still fresh.

As night came, Finck was completely surrounded on all sides by enemy's troops and artillery. The remnants of his corps assembled near Falkenhain under the protection of strong pickets. Ammunition were running low and all artillery pieces with the exception of 8 guns had been lost.

Daun formed his troops on the heights that he had gained and remained the whole night under arm. During the night, the Austrians received a fresh supply of ammunition from their camp at Plauen. Daun received a report from Seckendorf, left behind at Malter, that his piquets had come to contact with Prussian troops (elements of Kleist's detachment returning from a raid in Bohemia). Daun immediately ordered Seckendorf to defend the defile of Dippoldiswalde to the last. He also sent 6 bns and 2 cavalry rgts, under the command of Lieutenant-General Blonquet, to Hausdorf to support Seckendorf. Finally, Daun sent instruction to Buccow, who assumed command at Plauen in his absence, to detach Lieutenant-General Angern with 4 bns to Rupchen and to strengthen this post.

During this time, Stolberg's Brigade was reinforced by Pfalz Effern (2 bns), II./Kurpfalz Garde zu Fuß (1 bn) and some heavy artillery.

Finck planned to escape east of the Müglitz River. He sent detachments to reconnoitre the few crossings. They reported that light troops of the Reichsarmee were blocking all roads. Finck then held a council of war to determine if they should resume fighting at daybreak, or try to breakthrough at the favour of night. Both alternatives were rejected as impossible since, once deducted the units already captured by the Austrians, Finck could only count on a meager force of 2,836 men to accomplish these task. General von Wunsch then suggested that the dragoons and hussars should at least try to break through in the area of Possendorf. Finck agreed with his proposal and charged him to lead the attempt. However, Wunsch’s departure with the cavalry was much delayed by the nature of the terrain.

On November 21 at 3:00 a.m., Wunsch departed with the cavalry.

Reluctantly, Finck instructed Major-General von Rebentisch to initiate negotiations with the Austrians.

FM Daun, who had spent the night in Maxen, had rejoined his troops before daybreak. An hour before daybreak, he ordered the artillery as far forward as possible and instructed his grenadiers to be ready to launch a new assault at daybreak. About the same time, Rebentisch arrived at the most advanced Austrian piquet to speak to the commanding general.

By dawn, Wunsch’s 20 sqns were just debouching from the village of Sürssen.

FM Daun demanded that the entire Prussian corps surrendered as prisoners of war and sent Quartermaster-General Lacy to finalize the terms of capitulation with Finck.

The Austrian grenadiers had already started to cannonade the Prussian positions when Lacy returned with the information that Finck's Corps had surrendered as prisoners of war. Daun ordered his grenadiers to cease fire.

When he heard of the Prussian cavalry attempt to escape, Daun insisted that Finck should include these 6 cavalry rgts in the capitulation. Finck replied that Wunsch commanded a separate corps for which he could not possibly capitulate. Lacy threatened that the cannonade would immediately begin again if the troops under Wunsch did not return. Informed that Wunsch was making no progress anyway, Finck sent several officers to Wunsch with orders to turn back and signed the capitulation of his entire force, including his cavalry.


The Prussian prisoners were escorted to the great garden of Dresden.

In this action, the Prussians lost 3,000 men killed or wounded. The Austrians captured 9 general officers, 6 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 32 majors, 88 captains, 168 first lieutenants, 85 second lieutenants, 100 ensigns, 50 staff, 8 artillery officers, 258 subalterns, 14,922 NCOs and men, 96 colours, 24 standards, 3 pairs of silver kettle drums, 1 pair of copper kettle drums, 71 artillery pieces (25 x 3-pdrs, 2 x 4-pdrs, 18 x 6-pdrs, 17 x 12-pdrs, 9 howitzers), and 44 ammunition wagons.

The Austro-Imperial forces lost 304 men killed and 630 wounded, for a total of 934 men.

General von Finck would remain prisoners in Innsbruck until the end of the war. Frederick condemned Finck, Rebentisch and Gersdorff to two years of detention.

Order of Battle

Austrian Order of Battle

Commander-in-chief: Field Marshal Leopold Daun assisted by Franz Moritz Lacy

Summary: about 32,000 men

Order of battle listed from right to left

Sincère's Corps advancing from Dippoldiswalde to the west of Maxen

Advance Guard First Line Second Line
Major-General Baron Siskovics: 1st Infantry Column under Lieutenant-General Marquis d'Aynse  
  2nd Infantry Column under Lieutenant-General Baron Dombasle
  • Major-General Hartwegg
  1st Cavalry Column under Lieutenant-Colonel Count Schallenberg 2nd Cavalry Column under Lieutenant-General Count Stampa
seconded by Major-generals Vitzhum, Bettoni and Stainville

Detachment on the heights of Malter near Dippoldiswalde, under the command of Major-General Baron Seckendorff

Artillery: approx. 50 heavy guns

Brentano's Corps initially posted between Lockwitz and Röhrsdorf, 5 km north of Maxen

Reichsarmee Contingent under the command of FML Prinz von Stolberg

N.B.: some of the Grenzer light troops present came from the following units:

Prussian Order of Battle

Commander-in-chief: Lieutenant-General Friedrich August von Finck.

Summary: 18 bns and 35 sqns with 70 artillery pieces (including battalion pieces and the horse cavalry brigade), for a total of approx. 15,000 men

Order of battle listed from right to left

Platen's Brigade (part)

Bredow's Brigade (part)

Rebentisch's Brigade

Lindstedt's Brigade

Mosel's Brigade

Vasold's Brigade

Gersdorff's Brigade (part)

Wunsch's Brigade detached on the heights of Ploschwitz

Artillery deployed in several batteries across the front

  • 16 x 12-pdr guns
  • 16 x 6-pdr guns
  • 2 x 4-pdr guns (captured Bavarian pieces)
  • 27 x 3-pdr guns
  • 6 x 7-pdr howitzers
  • 3 x 10-pdr howitzers


This article incorporates texts from the following books which are now in the public domain:

  1. Grosser Generalstab Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II: Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, Part 3 Der siebenjährige Krieg 1756-1763, Vol. 11 Minden und Maxen, Berlin, 1912, pp. 196-211, Anhang 8
  2. Tielke, J. G., An Account of some of the most Remarkable Events of the War between the Prussians, Austrians and Russians from 1756 to 1763, Vol. 1 Sect. 1, Walter, London, 1788, pp. 8-73, plan 6
  3. Jomini, Traité des grandes opérations militaires, vol 2, 2nd ed., Paris:1811, pp. 188-190
  4. Carlyle T. History of Friedrich II of Prussia, Vol. 19
  5. Vanicek, Fr.: Specialgeschichte der Militärgrenze aus Originalquellen und Quellenwerken geschöpft, Vol. II, Vienna: Kaiserlich-Königlichen Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1875, pp. 475-477

Other sources

Tomczak, Martin, The Seven Years War 1756-63, 2005