1757 - Swedish campaign in Pomerania

From Project Seven Years War
Jump to navigationJump to search

Hierarchical Path: Seven Years War (Main Page) >> Campaigns >> 1757 - Swedish campaign in Pomerania

The campaign lasted from March to December 1757


Contextual map of the campaign - Copyright: Kronoskaf

On March 21 1757, Sweden entered into the war as an ally of France, Austria and Russia.

On March 30, the Swedish ambassador in Regensburg announced that his country had joined the coalition.

Protagonists - Copyright: Kronoskaf

Description of the Theatre of Operation

The possession of the island of Rügen was of particular value to Sweden due to the lack of good landing places on the Pomeranian coast. Indeed, under the protections offered by the Strela Sound and by the Fortress of Stralsund, disembarkation and embarkation of large units could easily be effected on the island of Rügen. Several streams ran through the gently undulating terrain extending between the coast and the Mecklenburg Lake District. These streams, bordered by wide swampy bank edges, formed considerable obstacles, dividing Western Pomerania into numerous sections of approximately equal length. Furthermore, most of these streams were crossable only at dams, which could easily be blocked and defended.

Theatre of Operation - Copyright: Kronoskaf

The rivers Recknitz and Peene with the Trebel were the most important obstacles, forming the frontiers between Swedish, Mecklenburger and Prussian territories. These rivers were bordered along most of their courses by 400 to 500 m. wide swamps and permanent passages existed only at Damgarten, Triebsees, Demmin and Anklam. There were also dams with ferries at Jarmen, Gützkow and Stolpe.

Thus, Western Pomerania was intersected by numerous obstacles which made the country particularly suitable for the Petite Guerre. Demmin and Anklam, as the two most important points of passage, had been fortified in earlier times. However, their defensive works were no longer maintained, since the heights on the southern bank of the Peene dominated them.

A Swedish offensive southwards would lead through wide swamps across the narrow country of the Mecklenburg Lake District towards Berlin while the well-developed road network of the rich Mecklenburg would allow them to effect a junction with the French army operating on the west side of the Elbe. However, the Prussian fortress of Stettin (present-day Szczecin/PL) would threaten the lines of communication of such a Swedish offensive against the Mittelmark. This fortress constituted the main stronghold and magazine of the Prussian Province of Pomerania and the defence of the entire province was articulated around it. The Swedes had no choice but to pay attention to Stettin from the very start of any offensive.

The islands of Usedom and Wollin at the mouth of the Oder also had a great importance for the Swedes. Their occupation would secure the flank of Swedish Pomerania and the road leading to Farther Pomerania (Eastern Pomerania), allowing them to intercept all trades with Stettin. However, the low water level prohibited the entry of large warships in the Oder Lagoon. Three fortifications defended the Island of Usedom and the mouth of the Swine River: a fort near Peenemünde, an entrenchment near the ferry at Anklam and an entrenchment near Swinemünde (present-day Świnoujście/PL). The fort was protected against sudden attack by its position in the water but had no bomb-proof shelter; the two other defensive works could not oppose any serious resistance to a concerted attack.

In the eventuality of a Swedish withdrawal towards Rügen, the broken country of Western Pomerania offered an opportunity to briefly delay the movements of their opponents. However, these obstacles became meaningless as soon as frost made the marshes passable. The Island of Rügen could be used as a last refuge, while the Fortress Stralsund could serve as an effective bridgehead as long as the Strela Sound remained ice-free, which was not the case in cold winters.

Description of Events

Preparations for the campaign

The peacetime garrisons of Swedish Pomerania were too small to oppose any serious resistance to a Prussian offensive. These forces consisted of the garrison (1 weak bn of each of three German rgt: Löwenfelska Infantry, Posseska Infantry and Spenska Infantry) of the strong but neglected Fortress of Stralsund.

Preparations for the campaign - Copyright: Kronoskaf

After the treaty of March 21 1757, the second bn of each German rgt were transferred from Sweden to Western Pomerania where they joined their parent bn in Stralsund.

In May, Field Marshal Baron Mathias Alexander von Ungern-Sternberg took command of a Swedish army consisting of 18,000 foot and 4,000 horse for a total of 22,000 men. These troops were very badly prepared: no commissariat, no magazine, no pontoon and no light troops.

Meanwhile, Sweden also assembled a small naval squadron at Stralsund.

From June 1, this army was gradually transported across the Baltic towards Swedish-Pomerania.

In June, the squadron sailed from Stralsund, appeared in front of the Island of Rügen and established a blockade of the Oder Lagoon, capturing or sinking several merchant ships. The captured ships were brought back to Stralsund where their owners could buy them back against ransom.

By the end of June, the Swedes had 6,000 foot and 1 unmounted sqn in Swedish Pomerania and 200 garrison artillerymen to serve the 500 guns in Stralsund.

The company of the Prussian New Garrison Regiment posted in Stettin, along with the Land Regiment Stockhausen, the Köller Grenadiers and the company Borchert of the Prussian Garrison Artillery were insufficient to properly man the outworks of the Fortress of Stettin.

On July 13, when Frederick II realised that Sweden would get involved in the war, he ordered the state general of Pomerania to raise and keep on foot, at their own expense, 10 militia battalions (500 men each). Brandenburg did the same and raised 5,000 men while Magdeburg and Halberstadt raised together 2,000 men. These troops were not part of the regular Prussian army (see Prussian Militia for a detailed breakdown of these units). These provinces also furnished a number of hussars who served throughout the war under the command of Werner and Belling.

On July 16, Frederick ordered the creation of a small flotilla to operate at the mouth of the Oder, in the Oder Lagoon. This flotilla consisted of 3 brigs, 2 galleys and 9 gunboats.

On July 27, Frederick detached Major-General Manteuffel from his army in Bohemia with a corps (Alt-Bevern Infantry, Prinz Moritz Infantry) to reinforce the Prussian forces defending Western Pomerania. He also ordered Flemming Fusiliers and I./Manstein Fusiliers to Western Pomerania.

On August 18, despite the unpreparedness of the Swedish army, the Swedish Riksråd (Privy Council) ordered the opening of hostilities.

Order of Battle
Detailed order of battle of the Swedish army at the end of August.
Detailed order of battle of the Prussian forces on September 12.

The Swedes were to be joined by 6,000 men belonging to the Duke of Mecklenburg.

At the beginning of September, the first line of the Swedish army extended from Damgarten to Wolgast on the Peene River. The second line was posted in Barth, Franzburg, Richtenberg, Grimmen and Greifswald. The cavalry was quartered between these places. The artillery and the three German rgts held Stralsund while 2 rgts occupied the Island of Rügen. The defences of the old Castle of Wolgast were put in readiness and the entrenchments in the Island of Rügen manned with a small detachment.

For their part, the Prussians had a small force of approx. 9,700 men in Pomerania under Major-General Heinrich von Manteufel.

Furthermore, part of the Land Regiment Stockhausen, the company of the New Garrison Regiment and the company (Borchert) of Garrison Artillery had been formed in mixed detachments and posted in various locations:

  • in the entrenchment near the ferry at Anklam (2 officers, 50 men)
  • in the entrenchment at Peenemünde (5 officers, 190 men under Captain von Oppen)
  • in the entrenchment at Swinemünde (a battery of 6 pieces on the east bank of the Swine manned by 2 officers and 50 men)

Once the land militia had received initial training, some of them were sent to reinforce these detachments. Repairs were also diligently undertaken on the Fortress of Stettin and preparations made to block the passages of the Peene, Swine and Dievenow.

Lieutenant-General Lantingshausen discreetly made preparations for the planned Swedish offensive, establishing batteries east of Freest opposite the entrenchment of Peenemünde and throwing a bridge across the Peene at Loitz.

Swedish Offensive

In the night of September 12 to 13, the Swedish army under Lieutenant-General Count Hamilton, deployed in three columns. The second Swedish column launched a surprise attack against the entrenchment near Anklam and captured it.

Swedish Offensive - Copyright: Kronoskaf

In the morning of September 13, the heads of the Swedish columns crossed the Peene at four places and advanced into Prussian-Pomerania. Because of his total lack of cavalry, Manteuffel remained at Stettin. The first Swedish column took Demmin; the second Anklam; and the third advanced through Wolgast upon the Island of Usedom where the Swedes captured the entrenchment of Swinemünde whose garrison had retreated after the destruction of the unfinished blockhouse. The other Prussian detachments defending the various entrenchments were taken prisoners. Only the isolated entrenchments at Peenemünde were still resisting against the Swedes.

On September 13 and 14

  • Swedes
    • 2 Swedish cavalry rgts crossed the new bridge on the Peene at Loitz. They effected a junction with the column under the command of Lieutenant-General Count Lieven near Spantekow. Lieven then advanced on Ueckermünde.
    • Major General Karl Ehrensvärd with 1,100 men, and 3 artillery coys with a number of heavy pieces invested the entrenchments at Peenemünde from two sides.

On September 15, Captain Oppen, who commanded at Peenemünde refused the terms of capitulation offered to him.

In the morning of September 23, the Swedish artillery (41 pieces) of Ehrensvärd’s Corps opened fire from the other side of the Peene on the Fort of Peenemünde, guarding the western exit of the Oder basin on Usedom Island. After a four hours bombardment, the Prussian garrison surrendered as prisoners of war to the third Swedish column.

After the successful passage of the Peene, Hamilton assembled all columns at Anklam and Swinemünde. Ueckermünde, Prenzlau and Pasewalk were soon occupied by Swedish troops and, within 6 weeks, a corps under General Horn levied heavy contributions (twice the annual tax levied by Prussia) throughout Ueckermark, a small province counting only 6 towns and 180 villages.

Throughout September, the Prussian main army on this theatre of operation (Lehwaldt's Army) was busy opposing a Russian invasion of East Prussia.

On September 22, the Swedish Riksråd (Privy Council) unanimously approved the subsidies treaty with France, bypassing the Riksdag (Parliament) which, according to the constitution, should have approved the treaty.

On September 29, when Frederick II realised that the Russian army was in full retreat towards Poland, he sent orders to General Lehwaldt to redirect his efforts against the Swedes in Pomerania.

At the end of September, Hamilton held a council of war where it was decided to remain on the Peene with the main body of the Swedish army, judging that the army was not strong enough to launch an offensive into the defenceless Mark without the assistance of the French. Accordingly, only the cavalry and some light troops advanced to the Uecker, securing the crossings at Ueckermünde and Pasewalk and occupying the region of Löcknitz.

After their first foray, Lieven’s badly battered cavalry regiments briefly returned to Anklam.

At the beginning of October, Hamilton sent Major-General Count Horn with 750 horse and 1,300 foot to occupy the entire line of the Uecker. Lieven soon followed Horn with 1,100 horse. A small engagement took place with Prussian hussars and jägers near Löcknitz. Since the Prussians had been unable to remove all supplies and coffers to Stettin, the Swedish cavalry did its best to seize them. They seized money in Prenzlau and small detachments were sent as far as Templin and Stettin.

Meanwhile, Manteuffel had so thoroughly repaired the fortifications of Stettin that a successful surprise attack seemed almost impossible.

Order of Battle
Detailed order of battle of the Swedish army at the end of October.

Prussian army of Field-Marshal Lehwaldt at the end of October.

On October 6, Lehwaldt, who was now at Tilsitt (present-day Sovetsk in Russia), received Frederick’s orders and began preparations to march against the Swedes in Western Pomerania.

On October 10, the Swedish Field Marshal Ungern-Sternberg finally arrived on the theatre of operation and took command from Hamilton. The Riksråd had instructed him to rehabilitate the reputation of Swedish arms, which had suffered from their failure in their last war against Russia. In total ignorance of the prevailing situation, he had been ordered to advance on Berlin, leaving the small Prussian force posted at Stettin on his flank. A French auxiliary corps would presumably join him on his way. When Ungern-Sternberg arrived at Anklam, he realised that approx. 2,000 men were on the sick list.

On October 13, the Swedes set off from Usedom, crossed the Swine on boats and suddenly appeared in front of the town of Wollin. Thus Wollin, the other important island of the Oder fell into the hands of the Swedes. The Swedish galley fleet anchored in the “Dänische Wiek” near Greifswald tried to break into the Oder Lagoon but all galleys, to the exception of the Malmö (?), ran aground in the attempt. Only the Malmö took part in the conquest of the island.

On the mainland, opposite the town of Wollin, there was a small skirmish between the Swedes and a Prussian detachment (Pomeranian Provincial Hussars von Hohendorff, Pomeranian Provincial Jäger-Corps von der Goltz) despatched there by Manteuffel. The arrival of the Pomeranian Land Militia Battalion Nr. 10 Kleist, hurriedly sent from Kolberg, prevented further incursions by the Swedes.

Since the planned advance on Berlin was impossible without Richelieu’s collaboration, Ungern-Sternberg sent him a second envoy (a first one had been sent by Hamilton in September). After several weeks, Richelieu finally answered that he could not provide such an important corps (approx. 11,000 men) on his own initiative and that he would have to refer to the court in Versailles.

On October 17, Lehwaldt left 2 bns of Garrison Regiment I Puttkamer and some garrison artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel von Wobersnow to guard Königsberg (present-day Kaliningrad) and Pillau (present-day Baltiysk); deployed 40 hussars under Lieutenant du Fay along the Memel; and set off for Western Pomerania with a force of 24 battalions and 50 squadrons (about 25,000 men) consisting of:

  • 4 grenadier battalions
  • 10 musketeers battalions
  • 10 garrison battalions
  • 30 dragoons squadrons
  • 20 hussars squadrons

On October 20, Lieutenant-General Count Lieven reported from Prenzlau that Prince Moritz von Anhalt had reached Potsdam with his Prussian army on October 17 and was now marching on Oranienburg. Ungern-Sernberg still ignored about Hadik’s raid on Berlin and thought that this army was destined for Western Pomerania. To his dismay, Lieven was ordered to retreat to the Uecker.

On October 26, Field Marshal Ungern-Sternberg moved his headquarters from Anklam to Ducherow.

On October 27, Ungern-Sternberg advanced once more from Ducherow to Ferdinandshof on the road towards Pasewalk. He then stayed in Ferdinandshof for three weeks without making any attempt against the Prussian positions around Stettin. Nor did he advance against Berlin, since the small Prussian force at Stettin, which could threaten the Swedish flanks, would have seriously impeded any advance on the Prussian capital.

On November 4 and 6, the two hussar rgts forming Lehwaldt’s vanguard crossed the Vistula.

On November 8, the Marquis de Montalembert, Richelieu’s envoy, arrived at the Swedish camp at Ferdinandshof to discuss of a joint offensive on Berlin.

On November 10, news arrived at the Swedish camp of the disastrous defeat of Rossbach (November 5). All plans for a Franco-Swedish offensive on Berlin were now rendered useless.

On November 12, the Swedes started to retreat from Prussian-Pomerania, redeploying behind the Peene with detachments at Anklam and Demmin. They also left troops to occupy the Island of Wollin and the entrenchments at Peenemünde.

On November 16, the main body of Lehwaldt’s Army crossed the Vistula.

On November 17, a Prussian detachment (500 hussars and 500 dragoons) under Major-General von Bandemer advanced from Ratzebuhr (present-day Okonek/PL) on Landsberg an der Warthe (present-day Gorzów Wielkopolski/PL) to act as if it was an advanced party of Lehwaldt’s Army marching towards Silesia while its real destination was Stettin.

Arrival of Lehwaldt's Army

On November 22, the head of Lehwaldt's column reached Stettin.

In the morning of November 24, a Prussian detachment under Major von Kahlenberg set off from Ost-Dievenow and marched towards the Island of Wollin where it captured 1 coy and two gunboats at Dievenow. These gunboats were incorporated into the small Prussian flotilla of Stettin as the Esping Nr. 3 and Esping Nr. 4. Meanwhile, Major von Kleist with the Pomeranian Land Militia Battalion Nr. 10 and 65 men of the Pomeranian Provincial Hussars von Hohendorff and Pomeranian Provincial Jäger-Corps von der Goltz destroyed the bridge of Wollin with his battalion guns. The Swedes evacuated the town of Wollin and took refuge in the Malmö galley. Two Prussian coys and 100 hussars then advanced to Usedom and occupied Swinemünde. The Swedish garrison retired to Wolgast.

On November 26, the small Prussian garrison occupying Swinemünde was forced to retreat in front of superior forces.

On November 27, now that the first elements of the main body of Lehwaldt’s Army had reached Stettin, Lieutenant-General Prince von Holstein-Gottorp was detached as vanguard with Ruesch Hussars, Malachowski Hussars, Finckenstein Dragoons, Holstein-Gottorp Dragoons and 1 bn of picked troops and 2 guns taken from Bevern Infantry and Prinz Moritz Infantry. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General von Schorlemer assembled 4 bns (Grenadier Battalion Kleist, Grenadier Battalion Manstein, I./Sydow, II./Sydow) and 7 sqns (5 sqns of Schorlemmer Dragoons and 2 sqns of picked hussars) in the Island of Wollin, planning to drive the Swedes out of the Island of Usedom.

Between November 28 and December 3, Holstein-Gottorp's vanguard took position along the Peene River between Anklam and Demmin.

On November 30, Lieutenant-General Prince von Holstein-Gottorp arrived at Stettin with Holstein-Gottorp Dragoons and Finckenstein Dragoons.

By the end of November, more than 3,000 Swedish soldiers were on the sick list.

At the beginning of December, the main body of Lehwaldt’s Army finally arrived at Stettin. From the Vistula, it had marched in four columns; part by Mewe (present-day Gniew/PL), Bütow (present-day Bytów/PL), Belgard (present-day Białogard/PL); and part by Tuchel (present-day Tuchola/PL), Konitz (present-day Chojnice/PL), Ratzebuhr (present-day Okonek/PL) and Dramburg (present-day Drawsko Pomorskie/PL).

For a long time, Ungern-Sternberg remained uncertain about Lehwaldt’s movements, which were cleverly screened by the Prussian hussars. Accordingly, Swedish troops were constantly issued new orders. Once again, Ungern-Sternberg expressed his desire to Havrincourt and Montalembert to effect a junction with a French corps in the Duchy of Mecklenburg. However, the ongoing Allied counter-offensive in Hanover made this plan unfeasible. Meanwhile the Riksråd reproached him for his recent retreat.

On December 3, Ungern-Sternberg held a council of war where it was decided to retire towards Stralsund with the Swedish main army and to assemble it between Grimmen and Greifswald. Detachments were left to guard the crossings and defensive works protected the dams. Ungern-Sternberg established his headquarters in Grünhufe. Only a small detachment of 3 coys, 1 sqn and two 3-pdr guns was left behind at Demmin.

Prussian Counter-Offensive

On December 12, with his entire army (about 28,000 men) assembled at Stettin, Lehwaldt advanced in two columns by Ueckermünde, as well as by Pasewalk, Friedland, and Daberkow towards the Peene. Lehwaldt planned to cross the Peene at Demmin while Holstein-Gottorp would advance to Gnoien with his vanguard, which had been reinforced with Grenadier Battalion Petersdorff, Grenadier Battalion Lossau and Lehwaldt Infantry.

Prussian Counter-Offensive - Copyright: Kronoskaf

In mid December, as ordered by Frederick, Lehwaldt sent Garrison Regiment II Sydow and Garrison Regiment XI Manteuffel to Silesia.

On December 20 in Stockholm, the Riksråd decided to send Count Rosen to replace Ungern-Sternberg at the head of the army operating in Pomerania.

On December 24, a detachment of Lehwaldt's cavalry, assisted by garrison troops from Stettin, recaptured Wollin.

On December 26, Swedish General Hessenstein retired from Usedom with his force.

On December 27, the last elements of the main body of Lehwaldt’s Army arrived in quarters between Alt Kosenow, Hohenbüssow, Demmin and the Peene.

Meanwhile, the Prussian covering force previously deployed along the Peene advanced on Dargun under the command of General Prince von Holstein-Gottorp.

On December 27 along the Trebel River, a Swedish detachment of cavalry and infantry was sent out to chase away a force of Prussian cavalry reconnoitering the Swedish positions. A large body of cavalry attacked the Swedish force as it approached the Prussian scouting party. The Swedish cavalry fled the field after firing a single volley. Västmanlands Infantry was left on its own and fought back bravely, loosing 18 men and 2 officers before returning to the camp. The units involved in this skirmish were:

  • on the Prussian side
    • a detachment of hussars belonging to Duke of Holstein's Corps (350 men)
  • on the Swedish side

By December 28, Demmin was defended by 1,300 foot and 50 horse. This garrison was hardly enough to man the ramparts. However, its defensive works had been improved and additional guns sent from Stralsund. A redoubt at Mayenkrebs covered the communication with the northern bank of the Peene. Lehwaldt intended to bombard Demmin and then to let the Prince von Holstein-Gottorp harass the Swedish garrison during its retreat northwards. To deceive the Swedes, Lehwaldt ordered diversionary attacks against the crossings of the Peene, downstream from Demmin.

In the night of December 28 to 29, in severe cold, the Prussians established two batteries of 16 pieces on the heights overlooking Demmin. Meanwhile, the Prince of Holstein-Gottorp threw a bridge over the Trebel and crossed from Beestland with his cavalry. He then drove Wrangel’s Volunteers out of Nossendorf. This small detachment then retired towards Demmin and took position at Mayenkrebs.

On December 29 at 5:00 a.m., the Prussian troops destined to the attack assembled near the Eugenienberg. A detachment of 2 bns (II./Kanitz, II./Below) and 5 sqns (Plettenberg Dragoons) was left there to protect the batteries. Meanwhile, Prinz Moritz Infantry approached Demmin from the south. A detachment (Rautter Infantry, I./Kanitz Infantry, 3 sqns of Platen Dragoons and 150 men of Ruesch Hussars) under Major-General von Platen took position to cross the Peene at Pensin and effect a junction with Holstein’s cavalry. Lehwaldt then summoned the commander of the place who refused to surrender. At 9:00 a.m., the Prussian artillery opened on Demmin. The Swedes replied with a lively fire. Meanwhile, the construction of a bridge at Pensin, which had begun during the previous night, had been so much delayed that it was 10:00 a.m. when Platen was finally able to cross the Peene. He had barely crossed the bridge when he received the order to halt. At the same time, the artillery duel stopped. Lehwaldt summoned the place a second time to unconditional surrender. Around 11:00 a.m., artillery fire resumed. When Platen heard the sound of the guns, he advanced towards Mayenkrebs and stormed the redoubt. He then opened fire on Demmin with his guns and two 12-pdrs belonging to Holstein-Gottorp’s detachment. By the afternoon, Lehwaldt’s batteries had had little effect and Platen’s guns had been silenced. Lehwaldt decided to postpone the assault on Demmin. As darkness fell, Prussian troops, including Platen’s and Holstein-Gottorp’s detachments, retired northwards to their quarters.

The presence of Holstein-Gottorp’s and Platen’s detachments on the other bank of the Peene had made it impossible for the Swedish commander at Demmin to obey orders received from Ungern-Sternberg the same day, instructing him to evacuate Demmin and rejoin the main army between Richtenberg and Greifswald. Surprisingly, when Lehwaldt recalled Holstein-Gottorp’s and Platen’s detachments, the Swedish commander did not seize the opportunity to retire as ordered.

With his advance line of defence along the Peene threatened, Ungern-Sternberg soon abandoned his design to offer battle between Richtenberg and Greifswald. In fact, he had no other choice than to retire to his next line of defence extending from Brandshagen through Borgwallsee to Prohn. Nevertheless, to avoid the wrath of the Riksråd, Ungern-Sternberg sought and received Montalembert’s approval. The latter could barely do otherwise in the face of the desolate state of the Swedish army.

On December 29, the Swedish garrisons of Damgarten, Tribsees and Loitz retired, closely followed by Platen Dragoons.

In the night of December 29 to 30, Lieutenant-General Hamilton evacuated Anklam with the garrison and a convoy transporting the sick, leaving a rearguard of 100 men in the town. He finally reached Greifswald after a 17 hours long march.

On December 30

  • Prussians
    • Lehwaldt hesitated to resume his attack on Demmin, hoping to spare the town from additional destruction. Soon, the Swedish commander began negotiations to obtain free withdrawal.
  • Swedes
    • A Swedish party defending the crossing at Nehringen was ordered to retreat on Triebsees in front of an attacking Prussian force. The Swedes undertook a fighting retreat in good order without casualties.
      • The units involved in this action were:
        • on the Prussian side
        • on the Swedish side (under the command of Gustaf Reinhold Stjerneroos)
          • a detachment of Västmanlands Infantry (120 men)
          • a detachment of the Smålands Horse (60 men under Rittmeister Johan von Gertten)
          • 1 gun and artillerymen under Lieutenant Anders Tollstedt

End of the campaign

On December 31, Demmin surrendered to the Prussians and the Swedish garrison was allowed to retire with the honours of war. The Prussians captured a number of iron pieces and some provisions in Demmin.

By the end of the year, the Swedish army had retired to Rügen Island, leaving a small garrison in Stralsund and a small force in the entrenchments of Peenemünde. Mecklenburg was now left alone to feel the wrath of Prussia.

In the evening of January 1, 1758 the Swedish garrison set off from Demmin with 2 field guns, its baggage and provisions and marched to Grimmen.

On January 2, Lehwaldt crossed the Peene at the head of his small army and advanced into Pomerania. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Schorlemer occupied Wolgast.

On January 4, Anklam capitulated and the Swedish garrison, consisting of 3 officers and 94 men, surrendered as prisoners of war.

On January 5, Lehwaldt’s vanguard reached Grimmen. Meanwhile, Schorlemer took possession of Anklam.

By January 6, Lehwaldt had recovered most of Prussian-Pomerania and completely bottled up the Swedes in Stralsund and Rügen Island. During their advance, the Prussian columns had captured important depots at Anklam and Greifswald, 42 vessels and 3,000 Swedes.

On January 7, Lehwaldt’s main body took position between Greifswald and Grimmen.

Lehwaldt's army wintered in Swedish-Pomerania, blockading Stralsund.

The Swedish force entrenched at Peenemünde resisted until March 13 1758 but it finally abandoned the position.

The Prussian army remained in Swedish-Pomerania until June 18 1758 when another Russian invasion of East Prussia forced it to abandon the blockade of Stralsund and to march eastwards. It was now under the command of General Count zu Dohna.


This article incorporates texts from the following books, which are now in the public domain:

  • Anonymous: The History of the Present War from its Commencement in 1756 to the End of the Campaign of 1760 , London
  • Anonymous: The Annual Register or The History of the Present War from the Commencement of Hostilities in 1755; and continued during the Campaigns of 1756, 1757, 1758, 1759, 1760 and to the End of the Campaign, 1761, London, pp. 207
  • Anonymous: A Complete History of the Present War, from its Commencement in 1756, to the End of the Campaign, 1760, London, 1761, 224-225
  • Archenholz, J. W.: The History of the Seven Years War in Germany, translated by F. A. Catty, Francfort, 1843, pp. 69-70, 101-103
  • Carlyle, T.: History of Friedrich II of Prussia, vol. 18
  • Grosser Generalstab: Geschichte des Siebenjährigen Krieges, Vol. 1, Berlin: 1824, pp. 457-459
  • Grosser Generalstab Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II: Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, Part 3 Der siebenjährige Krieg 1756-1763, Vol. 6 Leuthen, Berlin, 1904, pp. 108-133

Other sources

Cremer, Peter: Die preussischen Landregimenter & -milizen, die Stettiner Haff-Flotille und das Verpflegungswesen der Armee 1756-1753, KLIO-Arbeitgruppe, Heimbach, 1987

Frederick II: Posthumous Works of Frederic II King of Prussia, vol. 2, pp. 217-218

O'Hara, Danny: Eighteenth Century Wargaming Resources On-Line

Pajol, Charles P. V.: Les Guerres sous Louis XV, vol. IV, Paris, 1891, pp. 40-42

Säve, Teofron: Sveriges deltagande i Sjuåriga Kriget Åren 1757-1762, p. 57, 111, 121 ff. Stockholm 1915

Sharman, Alistair: Sweden's Role in the Seven Years War: A Brief Chronology 1756-1761, Seven Years War Association Journal Vol. XII No. 4

Wilson, Peter: Swedish Politics and Armed Forces in the Seven Years War, Seven Years War Association Journal Vol. X No. 1

Wilson, Peter: Swedish Mobilization and Strategy, Seven Years War Association Journal Vol. X No. 1

Wilson, Peter: The Campaign in Pomerania 1757-1762, Seven Years War Association Journal Vol. X No. 1


Gunnar W. Bergman for additional information on the Swedish artillery and on winter operations

Traveller for the description of the skirmish on the Trebel.