1760 - Siege of Colberg

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The siege lasted from August 27 to September 18, 1760


In June 1760, the Russian Konferéntsiya (Conference of the Highest Court) re-examined the plan of a siege of Colberg (present-day Kołobrzeg), which had already been considered in February. Russia wanted to get a fortified base of operation for his army in Eastern Pomerania. Furthermore, this fortress could then be used as a bargaining chip for the permanent cession of East Prussia to Russia during peace negotiations. The operation against Colberg was intended to be completely independent of the operations of the main army. The fortress was to be surrounded and taken under concentric fire from land and sea. For this purpose, a squadron of 21 ships of the line, 3 frigates and 3 bombs was assembled at Kronstadt and Reval (present-day Tallin/EE) under Admiral Mishukov. In addition, there was a transport fleet of 40 ships, which would transport a landing corps of about 6,000 infantry (mostly recruits) and artillery and the necessary siege equipment to Colberg. This corps would be placed under the command of Major-General Demidov.

In July, a few Russian ships reconnoitred the roadstead of Colberg.

At the end of July, while a Russian army was proceeding to the invasion of Brandenburg, a cavalry detachment under the command of Colonel Schwanenberg established its headquarters at Bullenwinkel (present-day Mirocice) near Colberg in preparation to form a junction with the Russian infantry transported by the fleet which should land near this fortress in August.

Description of the area

Description of the surroundings of Colberg

The mouth of the Persante River (present-day Parsęta River) and its wharf were not far from the northern outskirts of Colberg. The town was located on the right bank of this river.

On the left bank of the Persante, there were some buildings, three surrounding hills, a lake, forests and small streams flowing into the river. The biggest hills stretched from the village of Spinhauser to those of Werder and Sellnow (present-day Zieleniewo). Farther west, in the direction of Treptow (present-day Trzebiatów), the village of Bork (present-day Borek) stood around a small lake in the middle of the forest along a road leading to this big hill. The other hills stretched to the south behind forests separating coastal hills from the villages of Prettmin (present-day Przećmino) and Spie (present-day Błotnica), towering over the track leading to Treptow. Prolonging these hills to the east, in a straight line passing to the south of Sellnow and at right angle of Kartofelsberg, the Kauzberg hills blocked the approaches. Narrow strips of forests and patches of bogs extended behind these hills to the south.

On the right bank of the Persante River stood a group of four hills stretching southeastwards. The first and widest hill, called the Binnenfeld, extended from the waterside almost to the small Matzweise stream which separated it from a wood to the south, a little bit lower than the fortress. The hill of Wolfenberg dominated a plateau. To the south, almost at right angle with the Wolfenberg, there was a row of end moraines. These platforms formed a semicircle linking the Persante River with a pond. The highest points on this bank were the Klosterfeld and the Hohe Berg. A thick forest extended eastwards, making the access to Colberg difficult almost from the waterside all the way to the villages of Tramm (present-day Stramnica) and Stöckow (present-day Stojkowo) to the south.

Further south, an overflow area forbade the access to the Persante River from the west side, while bogs and the Matzikerteich lake blocked the eastern approach. However, the Green Hill facilitated the access to this strip of moraine hills. It was a key position and the only way to get access to these end moraines. These two separate groups of hills were linked by a third one. In the front of it was the so-called Bullenwinkel (present-day Mirocice). This position guarded the access to the area near Colberg. It was a key position very difficult to avoid, its left slope reached the lake. To the south of the Bullenwinkel and Green Hill was a tongue-shaped row of hills with many rivers and woods impeding communications. The Persante River was difficult to cross from both banks since it ran in a floodplain and its banks were covered with bogs. Furthermore, the Persante branched out into three or four smaller rivers as it drew near the Fortress of Colberg. These rivers then flowed into a single one at the place known as the Munde.

Fortifications of Colberg

Map of the Fortress of Colberg in 1761.
 1 Halberstadt Bastion
 2 Munde Hornwork
 3 Preussen Bastion
 4 Neumark Bastion
 5 Pommern Bastion
 6 Magdeburg Bastion
 7 Cleve Bastion
 8 Geldern I Bastion
 9 Geldern II Bastion
10 Bridgehead
11 Cofferdam
12 Geldern Gate
13 Leborsk Gate
 A Ravelins
 B Lunettes
 C Contregarde
 D Redans
Source: Tomasz Karpiński's collection

The fortifications of Colberg consisted of entrenchments surrounding the fortress, bastions and the surrounding curtain walls, which extended from west to east through the swamps along the Persante River. The shape of the entrenchments was irregular. A strip of entrenchment stretched along the left bank of the Persante supported by the bastions Geldern I, Geldern II and Cleve. The entrenchments on the right bank of the Persante were in the shape of a trapezium with bastions at each corners. In the suburb of Ujście, was the “Munde Hornwork”. The “Bulow Ravelin” ran in front of the fortress while the Lauenburg Ravelin ran from the river to Matz Wiese (present-day Stramniczanka). At the four corners of the city walls, there were bastions: Halberstadt, Preussen, Neumark and Pommern. Overall, 130 guns and 14 mortars of various calibre were planted in the entrenchments and bastions surrounding the fortress.

The outline of these entrenchments looked as illustrated below.

Profile of Colberg fortifications.
Source: Tomasz Karpiński's collection

The Fortress of Colberg was still in almost exactly the same condition as during the siege of 1758. The damages inflicted during the siege had been repaired, the Neumark Bastion expanded and a large hay and straw magazine, surrounded by entrenchments, built on the Münder-Felde. On the other hand, the entrenchments on the south-west corner of the Maikuhle had been abandoned because they could not be properly defended.

The garrison (approx. 1,500 men) was under the command of Colonel von der Heyde, who had already successfully defended the place in 1758. This time, too, he was actively supported by the inhabitants.

Description of events

On August 10, Russian ships sailed from Kronstadt to make a junction with another squadron sailing from Reval.

In mid-August, a cossack regiment took position at Stargard to cover the enterprise against Colberg from any intervention from the Prussian force posted at Stettin (present-day Szczecin).

On August 23, Russian cavalry and cossacks (a total of approx. 3,000 men) under Colonel Schwanenberg and Colonel Serebrakov, who had advanced from the Vistula, appeared before Colberg and invested the place from the land side. A small detachment of 1,000 foot, belonging to the corps of the Vistula, took position near Marienwerder (present-day Kwidzyn) to eventually reinforce the siege corps.

On August 26, the Russian fleet arrived in the roadstead of Colberg. Soon afterwards, landing long boats tried to approach the port entrance. However, they were driven back by the fire of the 4 heavy guns of the Munder Hornwork. Colonel von der Heyde reinforced the garrison of this defensive work, which consisted of only 1 officer and 30 men. This entrenchment prevented the Russian ships of the line and frigates from approaching the fortress within effective firing range, since the water outside the narrow roadway was too shallow.

On August 27, cossacks advanced and made themselves masters of Maikuhle. They then opened a lively fire against the rear of the Münder-Schanze, which was insufficiently secured on that side. Simultaneously, landing long boats were launched from the Russian ships and advanced towards the port entrance. However, these boats were soon driven back and a detachment sent from the fortress drove the cossacks out of Maikuhle. The Russian fleet had hitherto anchored beyond the firing range of the Münder-Schanze.

On August 28

  • Russians
    • The Russian fleet moved closer to the Münder-Schanze and opened fire on it. The Prussian artillery pieces of the defensive work answered. Around 2:00 p.m., the three flat-bottomed bombs advanced outside the usual roadway within musket range of the beach and dropped anchor east of the Münder-Schanze opposite the Münder-Felde. Two of these bombs, along with two flat-bottomed barges (each armed with 2 mortars) began to bombard the town of Colberg, while the third bomb shelled the Münder-Schanze.
  • Prussians
    • At first it was not possible to get at the Russian bombs from the fortress, since the firing range of the guns on the northern front only reached the beach. In fact, a threat to Colberg from these positions had been considered impossible because of the shallow waters. The Prussians first had to transfer long-range guns from other positions. This took time, however, and meanwhile the fortress was defenceless before Russian fire.

Fires broke out repeatedly in the town over the next few days, but these were soon extinguished by the active intervention of the fire brigade made up of inhabitants. The Münder-Schanze resisted vigorously, and even managed to damage some ships.

On August 29

  • Russians
    • The Russian naval squadron was reinforced by a Swedish squadron (6 ships of the line and 2 frigates) under Vice-admiral Langebielke. The Swedish squadron then took part in the bombardment.
    • Demidov started to land troops and siege equipment on the coast north of the forest of Colberg.
  • Prussians
    • In anticipation of a siege from the land side, Colonel von der Heyde began to clear the field of fire from the ramparts by laying down the trees, bushes, hedges and fences in and around the suburbs. However, out of consideration for the inhabitants, he wanted to wait before tearing down the houses.
    • Frederick II gave orders to Major-General Werner, who was at Glogau (present-day Głogów) in Silesia as part of General von der Goltz's force, to come to the relief of Colberg.

In the night of August 30 to 31, Russian cavalry patrols occupied the "Hohen Berg", located to the south-east of the suburb of Lauenburg. Shortly after midnight, cossacks tried to force their way into the suburb of Gelder but they were driven back by the defenders.

By September 1

  • Russians
    • Demidov had already landed 2,353 men and 5 battalion guns.
    • In the evening, a violent storm broke out, forcing the ships to cease fire and interrupting the landing operations.

On September 4

  • Russians
    • The storm having subsided, the Russians resumed their landing operations. Admiral Mishukov started to have doubts about the capacity of the landing corps, which consisted almost entirely of recruits, to drive back a serious relief attempt. He therefore asked to Lieutenant-General Mordvinov, commanding the corps posted on the Vistula, and Saltykov to send reinforcements to cover the siege.
    • A Russian infantry detachment attacked the entrenchments protecting the hay and straw magazines on the Münder Feld but it was driven back.
    • The Russian cavalry, which had to seal off the fortress from the land side, had not completed its task and nothing had been done to reconnoitre southwards in the direction of Cüstrin and the Warthe River.
    • Russian cavalry detachments occupied the Persante bridge at Gross-Jestin (present-day Gościno), while the bulk of the cavalry was quartered in Bullenwinkel. For the rest, the Russians relied on the vigilance of the cossacks, who carried out larger forays into the surrounding area.

On September 5

  • Russians
    • The naval bombardment resumed.
    • The Russians occupied the sand dunes north of the Fortress of Colberg. They now had a covered approach from their camp to the Münder-Schanze.
  • Prussians
    • The active Colonel von der Heyde had used the delay caused by the storm to repair all the damage to the defensive works of Colberg. Furthermore, the long-range guns transferred to the north front were now in position and opened against the Russian bombs and flat-bottomed barges, forcing the latter to withdraw.

On September 6

In the night of September 7 to 8, the Russians landed infantry with 4 artillery pieces at Maikuhle.

On September 8

  • Russians
    • The Russo-Swedish fleet deployed near Binnenrede to cover the planned assault on the Münder-Schanze.
  • Storming of the Münder-Schanze
    • Early in the morning, the Russians attacked the Münder-Schanze, while the troops who had taken position in the Maikuhle shot at the open throat of this entrenchment with their 4 artillery pieces.
    • Lieutenant Hallermann of the Garrison Regiment Puttkamer saw that his 30 men could not defend the entrenchment against such superior forces. He nailed his four heavy artillery pieces and then tried to break through with his men, but he was soon surrounded and forced to surrender.
    • The Russians immediately began digging a ditch next to the conquered entrenchment to serve as a first parallel.
  • Prussians
    • With the fall of the Münder-Schanze, the entrenchments around the hay and straw magazines became untenable by the Prussians. To save the troops defending this entrenchment from certain annihilation or capture, their commander brought them back to the fortress. They were soon followed by all detachments which had been sent out of the fortress. However, a strong detachment with a few light guns was left in the suburb of Gelder, which did not seem to be threatened by the expected attack from the land side.

In the night of September 8 to 9, Demidov planted a first battery on a sandy hill on the beach north of the Wolfs-Berg. The battery was ready by 3:00 a.m.

On September 9 at daybreak, the Russian battery on the beach was completed and opened against the Preussen Bastion located at the north corner of the walls of Colberg, while the flat-bottomed bombs shelled the town. The defenders initially managed to silence the battery, but the Russians reinforced the breastwork.

In the night of September 9 to 10, the Russian battery on the beach opened fire again. The Russians also tried to make themselves masters of the Pfannschmiede but they were forced to retire when the artillery on the walls opened against them with canister shots.

On September 10

  • Russians
    • With the Münder-Schanze in their hands, the besiegers were now able to move their warships closer so that they could take the town and its defensive works under fire.
    • The artillery of the besiegers concentrated its fire on the Preussen Bastion, which was soon in a very precarious state when a large supply of powder exploded and severely damaged the wall.
  • Prussians
    • A large part of the inhabitants took refuge in the suburb of Gelder, which had suffered the least from the shelling.
    • Colonel von der Heyde had the houses of the Pfannschmiede burned down.

In the night of September 10 to 11, the Russians advanced from the Münder-Schanze through the Baumgarten and established a cannon battery in it and a mortar battery at its eastern edge to fire against the Preussen Bastion.

On September 11, Werner's detachment reached Landsberg an der Warthe (present-day Gorzów Wielkopolski).

In the night of September 11 to 12, the Russians dug a trench in front of the two batteries across the Baumgarten as a second parallel and then established a fourth battery just west of the wood on the way from Munde to the Pfannschmeide, whose fire was directed at the Münde Hornwork.

On September 12

  • Russians
    • Cossacks burned down the barns in front of the Lauenburg Gate on the south side of Colberg, where the Russians had few troops because, until then, the crossing south of Sellnow across the Zingel ditch had been occupied by 260 foot.
    • The cossacks and the cavalry detachments posted in the villages in the immediate vicinity of the fortress were not strong enough to oppose any serious relief attempt.
  • Prussians
    • The uninterrupted bombardment of Colberg had already caused several fires.

On September 13

  • Prussians
    • Early in the morning, a grenade started a big fire in the magazine containing 200 ton of flour but the Prussians timely managed to get most provisions to safety.
    • The fortress came under fire from the south. The Russians had established three howitzers on the ridge west of Altstadt, on the road leading from Sellnow to the Gelder suburb. However, these were soon silenced by the heavy artillery of the Gelder Hornwork and the neighbouring bastion.
    • Werner's detachment marched from Landsberg to Bernstein (unidentified location), where he was joined by 150 Bayreuth Dragoons under Major von Froideville, who had previously been posted on the Lower Oder to keep communication with Stutterheim's Corps in Western Pomerania.
  • Russians
    • The fire of the Russian artillery suddenly stopped. An officer appeared before the fortress and summoned the defenders to surrender. The brave Colonel von der Heyde answered that the fortress was well supplied with ammunition and provisions and that he would defend it to the last. The Russians then resumed the bombardment.
    • In the evening, seven additional ships joined the Russo-Swedish fleet, bringing ammunition and provisions.

On 14 September

  • Prussians
    • Werner's detachment reached Zachau.
  • Russians
    • The Russians removed the 3 howitzers previously posted near Altstadt.

In the night of September 14 to 15, the Russians extended the trench of the Baumgarten up to the bank of the Persante River, where they established a fifth battery.

On September 15, Werner's detachment reached Freienwalde (present-day Chociwel) where it was joined by the Pomeranian Grenadier Battalion Ingersleben and the Grenadier Battalion Köller, who had been sent from Stettin by the Duke of Bevern. Werner was now at the head of 5 bns, 10 weak hussar sqns and 150 dragoons. His force totalled some 4,200 men.

On his way to Colberg, Werner was informed that a strong Russian cavalry detachment (some 800 horse grenadiers, hussars and cossacks) with 3 artillery pieces was advancing by way of Rosenow (unidentified location) in the direction of Gollnow (present-day Goleniów), not far to the north-east of Stettin, but he still had to give priority to the relief of Colberg.

On September 16

  • Prussians
    • Receiving alarming news from Colberg, Werner decided to march, instead of allowing a day-rest to his troops, and reached Labes (present-day Łobez).
  • Russians
    • A second parallel was opened near Nikolai church.
    • All Russians guns fired in honour of Empress Elizabeth. They intensively shelled the defensive works and the town. The Prussian artillery answered but could not prevent severe damages.

In the night of September 16 to 17, the Russians advanced from the Maikuhle towards the Gelder Hornwork and dug a trench at about 1,000 meters from it. They also established a battery but it did not yet contain artillery pieces.

On September 17

  • Prussians
    • Werner's Corps reached Schivelbein (present-day Świdwin) where it rested until noon, before advancing to Stolzenberg (present-day Sławoborze), only 30 km from Colberg. Werner had marched 300 km in 11 days. The speed of his advance combined with false rumours about his destination, which he had already spread when he left Glogau, gave him the opportunity to surprise the enemy at Colberg. He was well informed of the strength and deployment of the Russians siege corps and he knew that the bridge on the Persante at Gross-Jestin was only guarded by a small cavalry detachment, while a stronger Russian corps blocked the shortest way to Stettin through the marshes south of Sellnow (present-day Zieleniewo). Accordingly, Werner planned to drive back the detachment guarding the bridge of Gross-Jestin, cross the Persante River and then launch an attack against the camp of the main body of the Russian army.

In the night of September 17 to 18, the Russians drove the approach trench from the Baumgarten to the Nicolai Church on the Pfannschmiede and dug a third parallel opposite the Münde Hornwork and a seventh battery south-west of the church.

On September 18

  • Russians
    • In the morning, the seventh Russian battery opened against the defensive works of Colberg with cannister shots.
    • The Swedish Captain Poppe, who had been sent from Western Pomerania by Lantingshausen to report on the evolution of the siege, set off from Colberg and sailed for Western Pomerania. He was under the impression that the fortress would fall within a few days and that any relief attempt by the Prussian would materialize too late.
  • The Relief of Colberg
    • As Werner was marching in the direction of Gross-Jestin, he learned that the Russian detachment guarding the road leading through Sellnow consisted of only 200 men with one artillery piece. He changed his plan and confided the attack of the Russian outpost at Gross-Jetsin to 200 hussars, while he marched on Sellnow with the rest of his corps.
    • The 200 Prussian hussars chased the Russians from Gross-Jestin and followed them towards Bullenwinkel, destroying the bridge on the Persante.
    • When the fleeing Russian cavalrymen reached the main camp, they reported that a Prussian force of approx. 20,000 men was approaching.
    • During this time, Werner had advanced against the defile south of Sellnow and had the Kautzen-Berg, which commanded the dam over the marshland and the bridge over the Zingel-Graben, crowned with a few guns. Simultaneously, the jägers of the I./Freiregiment Wunsch and those of the Freibatalion Courbières advanced on Sellnow through marshes and meadows along the Persante.
    • The Russian detachment posted in a small redoubt at the north end of the dam was startled when the Prussian guns fired from the Kautzen-Berg. The Russians then spotted Prussian infantry advancing along the Persante in the direction of their left flank. Fearing to be cut from the Russian siege corps, the detachment abandoned its positions without opposing any resistance and retired towards Sellnow. It was immediately pursued by 300 Werner Hussars under Major von Bohlen and Major von Rosenkrantz. The Prussian hussars caught up with the retiring detachment and after a brief combat, captured 3 officers and 176 men, the rest of the detachment having been cut down.
    • Werner was now free to continue his advance. Around 2:30 p.m., he entered Colberg through the Gelder Gate and was jubilantly welcomed by the inhabitants, who had been surprised too by the unexpected arrival of a relief corps.
    • However, the Russian siege corps was still surrounding the fortress. Werner immediately left the town through the Lauenburg Gate and marched with his troops to the "Hohes Berg" to attack the Russian siege corps, which had meanwhile occupied the long and wide ridge north-east of Bullenwinkel.
    • Werner rode forward under escort to reconnoitre the terrain. He realised that the entire Russian front, from the beach up to south of Bullenwinkel was well covered by swamps and muddy meadows. Moreover, the attackers could not move close to the beach, where they would come under the fire of the Russo-Swedish fleet, and especially from the flat-bottomed bombs. To have any chance of success, he would have to proceed by way of Tramm. However, the day was already approaching its end, the troops had marched 45 km in a single day after previous strenuous marches and were tired. Furthermore, the Russians could field some 9,000 men while Werner could oppose them only 4,200 men. Werner then decided to postpone his attack to the next day. He planned to march at daybreak by way of Tramm and to attack the Russian left wing east of Bullenwinkel. His troops remained in their positions for the night.
    • In the evening, the Prussian cavalry drove back the Russian cavalry posted near Bullenwinkel and pursued it in the direction of Köslin (present-day Koszalin).
    • The flight of the cavalry was not without consequences for the Russian infantry, which was left without support. The exaggerated report about the strength of the Prussian relief force had already caused great unrest in the Russian camp. In the evening this unrest turned to panic. The soldiers hastened to the camp on the beach and threw themselves into the boats lashed up there. The panic soon spread to troops occupying the trenches and batteries. With his troops in such a condition, Major-General Demidov could not consider to offer battle.

In the night of September 18 to 19, the Russian siege corps hurriedly re-embarked aboard the fleet, abandoning its artillery and a large quantity of ammunition, siege tools, camp equipment, and provisions.

On September 19

  • Prussians
    • In the morning, peasants on Russian horses came to the fortress and reported to the defenders, who listened in astonishment, that the Russian positions and camp were completely deserted.
    • Werner's Corps advanced up to the Russian camp, north of the Colberg Forest. Considering his troops' need for rest, Werner sent Major von Froideville with only 200 cavalry, 200 volunteers from the free battalions and 2 guns to follow the Russian cavalry retiring towards Köslin. The captured equipment was transported from the Russian camp to the fortress. Then Werner returned to his initial position on the heights east of Altstadt because the beaches was still under the fire of the Russian fleet.
  • Russians
    • The Russo-Swedish fleet continued an uninterrupted bombardment, even though the eight Swedish warships eventually weighed anchor and sailed away.

On September 20

  • Prussians
    • In the morning, the commander of Colberg, Colonel von der Heyde, re-occupied the entrenchment of the Münder-Schanze and started levelling the deserted Russian trenches, approaches and batteries, and transported the captured guns (including 15 heavy guns (from 24 to 36-pdrs), five howitzers, two mortars and two 3-pdrs guns) and the military equipment left behind by the Russians to the fortress. Werner's troops helped in these endeavours. All this labour took place under the fire of the Russian fleet and of the flat-bottomed bombs.
    • Werner's troops took up quarters in the neighbouring villages.

On September 21, Colonel von der Heyde established a battery for 10 guns and 2 mortars near the former hay magazine on the "Münder-Felde", forcing the Russians to recall their flat-bottomed boats.

In the night of September 21 to 22, the fire of the Russian fleet gradually died down.

On September 23

  • Russians
    • Early in the morning, the Russian fleet weighed anchor and sailed eastwards in the direction of Reval and Kronstadt with the transports that were bringing the siege corps home.
  • Prussians
    • Werner detached Major von Bohlen with 200 cavalrymen towards Rosenow to locate the Russian cavalry detachment, which had been reported in this area while he was marching on Colberg.
    • Werner ordered Major von Froideville, who was in the vicinity of Köslin, to march towards Bublitz (present-day Bobolice).
    • Froideville, who had not yet received these orders, marched back to Colberg, where he reported that the Russian cavalry, which he had pursued from Bullenwinkel to Köslin, had now retired by way of Schlawe (present-day Sławno) to Stolp (present-day Słupsk).
    • Werner's cavalry detachments informed him that the Russian cavalry detachment was no more in the vicinity of Gollnow but had already retired by way of Schivelbein and Neustettin (present-day Szczecinek).

During the siege, the losses of the garrison of Colberg amounted to 50 killed and 29 wounded; while the population had lost 20 killed and 53 wounded. For their part the Russians had lost 333 men killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Vice-Admiral Langebielke reported that some 100 Prussian deserters had taken refuge in the Russian camp.

On his arrival in Russia, Demidov would be harshly received in St. Petersburg and court-martialled.

On September 24, Werner was informed that the Russians were advancing on Köslin again. He decided to confront them on the next day.

On September 25

  • Prussians
    • As Werner's Corps was ready to march towards Köslin, Major von Bohlen reported that the Russians had turned back. Immediately afterwards, Werner received a letter from the governor of Stettin, the Duke of Bevern, instructing him to march with his corps to Stettin in order to turn against the Swedes who had taken position near Prenzlau. Werner sent his troops back to their quarters to prepare for the departure scheduled for September 26.
    • To deceive the Russians, Werner sent a detachment of 200 foot and 200 cavalrymen together with 2 guns to Köslin, with instructions to spread the rumour that Werner would follow the Russians with his whole corps by way of Schlawe and Stolp. This detachment had instructions to rejoin Werner's Corps at Greifenberg (present-day Gryfice) on September 28, during its march towards Stettin.

On September 26, Werner's Corps set off from the vicinity of Colberg and marched by way of Treptow (present-day Trzebiatów) and Greifenberg in the direction of Stettin.

On October 1, Werner's Corps reached the area east of Stettin.

On October 2, Werner's Corps marched through Stettin and took up quarters in the villages between Stettin and Löcknitz, in preparation for a counter-offensive against the Swedes in Western Pomerania,

Order of battle


Prussian Garrison of Colberg

Commander-in-chief: Colonel von der Heyde

Werner's Relief Corps

Commander-in-chief: Major-General Paul von Werner


Naval Forces

Commander-in-chief: Admiral Zacharias Mischukov

Siege Corps

Commander-in-chief: Major-General Demidov

Cavalry (approx. 1,300 horse) under Colonel Schwanenberg

  • Serebiakovs’ Cossacks
  • Unidentified dragoon units

Infantry (5,000 men) (transported by the fleet)


Anonymous, A Complete History of the Present War, from its Commencement in 1756, to the End of the Campaign, 1760, London, 1761, p. 536

Carlyle T., History of Friedrich II of Prussia vol. 20

Gieraths G., Die Kampfhandlungen der Brandenburgische-preussischen Armee, Berlin 1964

Grosser Generalstab Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II: Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen, Part 3 Der siebenjährige Krieg 1756-1763, Vol. 13 Torgau, Berlin, 1914, pp. 140-156

Jomini, baron de, Traité des grandes opérations militaires, Vol. 3, 2nd ed., Magimel, Paris, 1811, pp. 335-336

Klase H., Die Russem vor Kolberg, Kolberg 1911.

Kroczyński H., Twierdza Kołobrzeg, Warszawa 2006.

Masłowskij D, Der Siebenjahrige Krieg nach Russischer Darstellung, A. Drygalski, t. 3, Berlin 1893.

Masłowskij D., Russkaia armiia w siemieletnojuju wojnu, t. III, Moskwa 1891.

Riemann H., Geschichte der Stadt Colberg, Colberg 1873.

Stoewer R., Geschichte der Stadt Kolberg, Kolberg 1897.

Voelker J., Geschichte der Stadt Kolberg, Kolberg 1964.


Tomasz Karpiński (student at the Institute of History, University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań, Poland) for the initial version of this article